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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
History of Grain Dust Explosions 
Grain dust explosions in the grain handling industry have been reported in 
the United States since the 1800's. It was not until 1913, following an incident in a 
Buffalo, New York, feedmill in which 33 persons were killed, that concern was felt 
outside the industry. In 1913 the United States Department of Agriculture's Bureau 
of Chemistry initiated a study on the v<)latility of agricultural dusts (Chiotti and 
Verkade, 1976). 
From December 21 to 28, 1977,, there were 57 persons killed and 48 injured 
in just five elevator and feedmill explosions. In response, the U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture, Bob Burgland, announced an "immediate and continuing effort to find 
the cause of and cures for grain dust explosions." A task force on grain elevator 
safety and explosions was appointed. A report of 250 explosions attempted to 
determine the relationship among them and find a common denominator (USDA, 
1980). 
The number of grain dust explosions has decreased since 1980. Table I 
documents current statistics of incidence of grain dust explosions and the associated 
number of deaths, injuries and estimated dollar losses since 1980. 
The bucket elevator leg is identified as the most likely location for the 
occurrence of a grain dust explosion (NMAB, 1982). Bucket elevators are the 
primary vertical conveying component used by the grain industry. They consist of 
1 
Year 
87 
86 
85 
84 
83 
82 
81 
80 
Total 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF GRAIN DUST EXPLOSION INCIDENCE 
IN THE U.S. SINCE 1980. * 
2 
Number Number Number Estimated Damage 
of of of to Facility 
Explosions Deaths Injuries (million$) 
15 0 18 8.3 
21 2 14 1.6 
22 4 20 65.0 
21 9 30 19.9 
13 0 14 3.6 
14 6 34 15.0 
21 13 62 29.0 
44 10 47 10.0 
171 44 239 152.4 
*(Schoeff, 1988) 
rows of metal or plastic buckets mounted on reinforced rubber or PVC belting and 
are enclosed by a sheet metal casing (see Figure 1). 
Theory of Grain Dust Explosions 
Before an explosion can occur, four components must be present: (1) grain 
dust serving as fuel must be suspended in the air at a level higher than the minimum 
explosive concentration (MEC); (2) sufficient oxygen is needed to support 
combustion; (3) an ignition source of sufficient energy and duration; and (4) the 
above three elements must occur within a confined space. When these conditions 
exist concurrently, a dust explosion may occur. 
Fuel for a grain dust explosion is grain dust in suspension at or above the 
MEC, reported to be 50 g/m3 (0.5 oz/ft3) (Palmer, 1973). Grain dust in suspension 
at a concentration below the MEC willl not fuel a grain dust explosion in the 
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Figure 1. Schematic of Typical Grain Handling Facility 
w 
4 
presence of the other three ingredients. 
Oxygen and containment are likely to be present in certain areas within any 
grain handling facility. Containment contributes to a grain dust explosion in two 
ways. First, the restricted volume allows for the development of the MEC by 
restricting the dispersion of aerated gra[n dusts. The MEC for grain dust is so high 
that it is not likely that it could occur without confinement or in large open areas 
inside a grain handling facility. Sufficient confinement is provided by elevator legs, 
storage bins, and covered conveyors. Secondly, containment provides a means for 
the creation of a pressure gradient required for rapid combustion that results in the 
over pressure of the secondary structure. 
The sources of ignition in a grain dust explosion are varied. They include 
smoldering grain and grain dust, hot surfaces created by over-heated bearings, or 
friction between drive pulley and belting material, use of improper welding and 
cutting safety practices, friction sparks from the binding of tramp metal or other 
foreign objects, electric sparks, the disdharge of static electricity, and spontaneous 
heating from biological and chemical activity, to name a few. 
A grain dust explosion is actuallb' a series of explosions, consisting of a 
primary explosion followed by multipl~ secondary explosions. The primary 
explosion is usually a small over-pressure propagating a pressure front of 
approximately 13.8 kPA (2 psi). The ptessure front expands from the point of 
ignition at an approximate velocity of jOS m/s (1000 ft/s) (Palmer, 1973). The 
pressure front may expand throughout a facility and aerate layered dust in its path. 
The subsequent fire front may serve as1 an ignition source for the newly formed dust 
clouds. In this way multiple secondary explosions can occur throughout a grain 
handling facility. 
Secondary grain dust explosions are by far the most devastating. These 
explosions propagate a pressure front @f approximately 552 kPa (80 psi) moving at 
over 305 m/s (1000 ft/s). No conventional grain handling structure can withstand 
this magnitude of internal pressure. 
Systems Approach to Grain Dust Explosion Prevention 
5 
Research has identified many of the deterministic aspects of the grain dust 
explosion problem. The vast range of variables involved emphasizes the complexity 
of the problem. Other similar problems are often approached from a systems point 
of view. 
A system can be described as "a collection of items from a circumscribed 
sector of reality that is the object of study or interest" (Pritsker, 1986). A primary 
objective of this type of problem solving technique is to chose the proper system. 
This involves adequately defining system boundaries, inputs, outputs and 
assumptions (known as the world view)~ 
A systems approach to the grain dust explosion problem requires the 
interaction of the system inputs to be determined as well as their respective 
influence on the output of the system. ln this case, the system output is the 
occurrence, or non-occurrence, of a secondary grain dust explosion. The subsequent 
determination of the probabilities of occurrence of the system inputs leads to the 
determination of the probabilities of otcurrence of the system outputs. 
CHAPTER II 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem of grain dust explosions has not been studied from a systems 
point of view. This void allows over-sight of critical components or practices. With 
a systems approach, the problem can be systematically dissected with less regard for 
individual biases and prejudices. This research is designed to analyze the problem 
of grain dust explosions in such a manner. 
Objectives 
The overall objective of this research is to predict the probability of the 
occurrence of a secondary grain dust etplosion inside a bucket elevator leg. The 
occurrence of a secondary grain dust explosion in a bucket elevator leg is defined as 
a failure. A model is developed requirling the following specific steps; 
1) Identify the known events leading to a failure. 
2) Identify the combinations of base events necessary to cause a failure. 
3) Assign point estimates of the priobability of occurrence to each base event 
and determine which combinations of base events are most likely to occur. 
4) Demonstrate the applicability of the model. 
5) Develop recommendations for resource allocation to prevent a failure. 
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF UTERATURE 
Research, in prevention of grain dust explosions has been limited to the 
physics and the factors contributing to the explosion phenomenon. These 
contributing factors include the detemtinistic aspects of the explosion, the physical 
and chemical properties of grain dust, and methods to minimize the dust 
concentration in grain handling facilities. Pratt (1979) and NMAB (1982) suggest 
that a systems approach to the problem of grain dust explosions would provide 
additional insight to this problem but fall short of providing a working model. 
Procedures used in reliability and hazard analysis offer conceptual techniques which 
are applicable to the problem of grain dust explosions. 
Deterministic Aspectts of Grain Dust Explosions 
Palmer (1973) documents many of the explosive properties of explosive 
dusts. These properties include rninirrtum ignition temperature, minimum explosive 
concentration, minimum ignition ener$)', maximum explosive pressure, maximum 
rate of pressure rise. This data although not applicable to every situation, gives 
good estimates. 
Cross and Farrer (1982) Present theoretical discussion of the ignition process 
devoted primarily to the discharge of Static electricity and the energy needed to 
cause ignition of a dust cloud. 
7 
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Physical Properties of Grain Dust 
The dispensability and combustion rates of grain dust are governed by 
chemical and physical properties of the dusts. The ease of grain dust aeration is 
dependent upon its particle size distribution and particle density. The rate of 
combustion is highly dependent on the exposed surface area of dust that can readily 
react with oxygen. These physical properties are the key to defining dust 
explosibility (Parnell et al., 1984 ). 
Various laboratory techniques have been used to determine the different 
physical properties. A discussion of the techniques and the physical properties of 
com, wheat, soybeans, rice and sorghum dusts are presented by Parnell et al. (1984). 
Control of Airborne Concentrations of Grain Dust 
Dust control is a problem that confronts all grain handling facilities. Normal 
elevator grain movement at elevators produces dust, estimated at 0.14% (by weight) 
of the moving grain (U.S. GMRL, 1982). In large elevators grain movement can 
amount to tons of dust per hour of operation. 
In recent years much attention has been given to controlling dust for several 
reasons: (1) grain dust explosions have caused losses of millions of dollars and loss 
of lives; (2) rising energy cost are increasing the cost of dust collection and 
ventilation; (3) worker health problem$ have been related largely to dust inhalation; 
and ( 4) tightening of Environmental Piiotection Agency (EPA) and Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) air pollution standards are increasing 
industry investments for dust control equipment (Goforth, 1985). 
Dust handling is a continuous ptocess at every active elevator. Dust 
collection systems must operate each dme grain is moved, requiring large volumes 
of air for collection and separation in tlltering devices such as cyclones and bag-type 
filters. Inadequate design of ventilation systems and equipment breakdowns may 
result in clouds of dust exceeding the MEC. Wade and Hawk (1980) found that 
explosive conditions occurred consistently in bins and high speed bucket elevators 
during operation, and noted that the presence of dust control systems had no 
measurable effect on the dust concentration inside the elevator legs. 
9 
The lack of effective dust control inside elevator legs is not uncommon. Dust 
control systems are not designed to handle the quantity of dust being conveyed by 
the grain handling operation (Wade and Hawk, 1980). It is not uncommon 
therefore that complete separation of dust from grain, interpreted by some to be 
dust control, is never achieved. 
Layers of settled dust on equipment, floors, and building structures that 
could fuel a secondary explosion (Schulman, 1983) are considered the chief hazard 
(Parnell and Barton, 1979). Good housekeeping has long been considered a major 
part of any dust management plan (Theimer, 1972; Marshall, 1983; NMAB, 1982). 
Schulman (1983), however demonstrat¢d that layered dust was not essential to 
produce a secondary explosion. Dust ftiom an initial explosion may be carried into 
otherwise clean areas and fuel a secondary explosion. The significance of this 
phenomenon is the implication that a pressure front can propagate in an elevator 
with little or no settled dust (except for the confined space of the initial explosion) 
and propagate a series of explosions with fuel provided by a leg, bin or enclosed 
conveyor. 
The use of mineral oil additives to grain has been shown to be an effective 
technique for the suppression of aerated dust (Jones, 1986; Lai et al., 1986; Cocke 
et al., 1978). It has also been determined that the effectiveness of the mineral oil is 
dependent on the type of grain being tiieated and the mineral oil application rate 
(Jones, 1986). Further studies should be performed to determine the reduction of 
grain dust levels inside bucket elevator legs as a result of mineral oil applications. 
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Control of Ignition Sources 
Reducing the number of ignition sources in a grain handling facility is a 
crucial element in preventing grain dust explosions. The use of electrical equipment 
in grain handling facilities which comply with National Electric Code standards is 
required by OSHA. Bearing monitors, motion sensors and other detection systems 
are suggested so that over heated bearings, misaligned belts and other abnormal 
operating conditions can be controlled. Grates, magnets or other separation devices 
should be used to decrease the possibiUty that foreign matter will enter the 
conveying equipment. 
It is highly unlikely that 'normal' elevator operation will result in a grain dust 
explosion. Most programs or use of de~ces which reduce the occurrence of ignition 
sources contribute to the safety of the facility. However, injudicious use of such 
programs or devices can be wasteful and have limited effectiveness (NMAB, 1982). 
Explo$ion Venting 
Explosion venting is the controllled release of explosion pressure from a 
confined area. This process involves equipping the confinement with explosion 
relief panels (Gillis, 1981). The panels must be of adequate size and correct rupture 
strength so that the pressure developed from an explosion will be vented to the 
atmosphere before internal pressures can reach a destructive level. 
The sizing and placement of the: explosion vents is a complex process 
dependent on the geometry of the enclosure and the dynamics of the explosion 
process (NMAB, 1982). A probabilistic approach to sizing explosion vents has been 
examined (Echoff, 1986). This approaeh is similar to stress-strength consideration 
of structural designs except the panels are expected to fail therefore venting the 
internal pressure. 
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Explosion Suppression 
The use of explosion suppressiolil devices has been met with both praise and 
criticism. Opponents to this action site the unreliability of the explosion suppression 
systems. This unreliability stems from inadvertent releases of the Halon gas, slow 
response time of the detection systems and high capital investment. These 
opponents do, however, acknowledge their effectiveness in enclosed areas such as 
bucket elevators and dust collection systems (NMAB, 1982). 
The theory of explosion suppression is based on the initial detection of the 
explosion and subsequent release of "otygen absorbing" gases or suffocating 
powders which prohibit flame propagation (Gillis, 1981). The detection of the 
initial explosion is generally accomplished with pressure sensors located at various 
points throughout the elevator leg. Th¢ realization of a sudden pressure increase by 
the pressure sensors actuates the release of the extinguishing agent. The most 
common gases used for this application are Halon 1011 (Bromochloromethane) and 
Halon 1301 (Bromotrifluoromethane ). These gases actually bond the available 
oxygen in the explosion environment rendering the atmosphere unable to support 
combustion (NMAB, 1982; Gillis, 1981). 
Risk Assessment of Complex Systems 
Risk assessment of complex systems involves aspects of probability theory, 
differential calculus, Boolean logic and algebras, and set theory. The combination 
of these fields of study result in a powerful analysis tool. Through the use of set 
theory and Boolean logic and algebras~ the complex systems are heuristically 
decomposed into simpler subsystems. Concepts of probability theory and 
differential calculus are then applied t~ determine quantitative information about 
the system (Fussel, 1973). 
Reliability analysis and probabillistic risk assessment is a by-product of the 
problems associated with electronic systems designed for use in World War II. A 
rnpre rigorous method was needed to analyze these complex systems (Kapur and 
Lamberson, 1977). 
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Reliability has been, and will continue to be, defined in many ways. For the 
purposes of this discussion, 'reliability' will be considered to be " ... the probability of 
a device performing its purpose adequately for the period of time intended under 
the operating conditions encountered" (Carter, 1972). 
Many researchers of systems reliability construct reliability diagrams which 
are representations of the operational rtelationships of each of the components. 
Researchers concerned with the safety or failure of a system often construct 
graphical models known as fault trees. It can be shown that these two approaches 
are equivalent in that they are complements of each other (Shooman, 1970). 
Equations 1 and 2; 
where 
R(t) = 1- F(t) 
P[T > t] = 1 - P[T < t] 
R(t) = reliability at time t; 
F(t) = probability of failure at timet; 
P[T > t] = probability that time to failure, T, is greater than timet; 
P[T < t] = probability that time to failure, T, is less than time t; 
show specifically the implications of these concepts. 
History of Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a common method of systems safety analysis. 
(1) 
(2) 
FTA had its beginning in the early 1960's during the development of the Minute 
Man missile systems. The prime objective of the study was to analyze inadvertent 
missile launch (Barlow and Lambert, 1975). FfA was developed to determine 
quantitative probabilities, however it is commonly used for its qualitative aspects 
because of the systematic approach of the presentation of the factors involved in a 
system (Hammer, 1980). 
Fault Tree Logic and Construction 
13 
Fault trees are constructed of lqgic and event building blocks (Figure 2). The 
AND, OR, continuation, base event, and secondary event symbols are used in this 
particular study. A complete description of each of these symbols is shown in Figure 
2. 
The first step in fault tree analySis is to select a top event. The top event is a 
state of the system in which information about the probability of occurrence is 
desired. The selection of the top event is generally a result of some type of hazard 
analysis, which would identify undesirable states, or by intuition about the system. 
As an example of a top event, consider an automobile as the system under 
consideration. "Brake failure" could b¢ selected as the top event. 
The fault tree is constructed so lhat the sequence of events that lead to the 
undesirable event are shown below the top event as a consequence of the AND and 
OR gates. These events are further developed until the sequence of events lead to 
the basic events. The basic events represent the resolution of the fault tree (Barlow 
and Lambert, 1975). This resolution i$ a function of the knowledge of the system 
and the availability of data. 
The structuring process identifies three failure mechanisms that contribute to 
the occurrence of the top event (Haasl, 1965). The failure mechanism were defined 
by Haasl (1965) as follows: 
A 
e 
81 82 
~ 
81 82 
¢ 
-o 
6 
0 
-o 
AND gate. A logical AND relation. Output A exists if and only if all of 81 ,82,etc 
exist simultaneously. 
OR gate. A logical imclusive OR relation. Output A exists if any of 81, 82, etc., 
or any combination thereof, exists. 
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Inhibit gate. Permits,applying a condition or restriction to the sequence. The input 
and condition or res1riction must be satisfied for an output to be generated. 
Identification of a particular event. When contained in the se9uence, usually de-
scribes the output or an input of an AND or an OR gate. Applied to a gate, Indi-
cates a limiting con!iition or restriction that must be satisfied 
An event, usually a malfunction, describable in terms of a specific component 
An event that is no{mally expected to occur; usually an event that always occurs 
unless a failure tak!ls place 
An event not develbped further because of lack of information or of sufficient 
consequence. Co!Jid also be used to indicate further investigation 1s intended 
when add1t1onal inJormatlon becomes available Symbol W w1th a numencal 
subscript is some~mes used also 
Indicates and stipl,llates restrictions. With an AND gate, the restriction must be 
fulfilled before the ~!Vent can occur With an OR gate, the stipulation may be that 
the event will not otcur in the presence of both or all inputs simultaneously 
When used with an inhibit gate, stipulation is a variable condition. 
A connecting sympol to another part of the fault tree within the same ma1or branch 
Has the same fun¢tions, sequence of events, and numerical values. 
A connecting sym!>ol to another part of the fault tree 
Figure 2. Fault Tree Logic Symbols (Fussel, 1973) 
1) primary failure- failure due to the internal characteristics of the system 
element under consideration (example: light bulb burns out). 
15 
2) secondary failure - failure due to excessive environmental or operational 
stress placed on the system element (example: light bulb burns out as a result of 
excess voltage). 
3) command failure- failure du¢ to inadvertent operation or non-operation 
of a system element due to failure(s) of initiating element(s) to respond as intended 
to system conditions (example: light bulb burns out as a result lack of maintenance 
of light bulb socket). 
When the bottom leaves of the fault tree are a combination of the previously 
described failures, the tree is complete., 
The construction of the fault tree is not an end but a means to learn more 
about the system. The completed tree can be used as a tool to identify failure 
combinations that might have been otherwise overlooked. The graphical format of 
the tree allows for the ease of communication of qualitative or quantitative 
information about system failures. Appendix A illustrates the construction and 
evaluation of an example fault tree. 
Qualitat:live Evaluation 
The qualitative evaluation of the fault tree involves determining the 
minimum cut sets of the logic tree. A CUt set is a set of base events whose 
concurrent existence insures the occurrence of the top event (Barlow and Lambert, 
1975). Another name for cut sets is Boolean Indicated Cut Sets (BICS). BICS are 
actually cut sets assuming that a primany event appears only once in the fault tree 
(Fussel and Vesely, 1972). A cut set is tminimal if the set of failures cannot be 
reduced and still insure the occurrence of the top event. Minimum cut sets are 
useful because they identify the minim111m combination of fault events which cause 
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the top event. 
With large fault trees it is difficult, if not impossible to determine all of the 
minimum cut sets by inspection. There exist many algorithms capable of 
determining minimum cut sets. Most o[ these algorithms, like most other 
algorithms, can be performed 'by hand" but are generally computer generated 
because of time and cost considerations. A concept common to all of the algorithms 
is that an AND gate will always increase the size of the cut sets while an OR gate 
will always increase the number of cut sets (Fussel and Vesely, 1972). 
Quantitative Evaluation 
Certain assumptions must be made to obtain quantitative information from a 
fault tree. The main assumption deals with the concept of independence of primary 
events. The assumption is common to 'reliability theory (Kapur and Lamberson, 
1977). This assumption of independeD!ce indicates that the ultimate probability is 
only an approximation (but a good approximation) that can be used, at the very 
least, to rank the contributions of each! base event or groups of base events to the 
occurrence of the top event. 
The primary events of a fault tree are considered to be independent 
variables. The independent variables are assigned point estimates of their 
probabilities of occurrence (failure). These estimates are the inputs for the 
quantitative analysis. Quantitative analysis is motivated by the implications of the 
logical operators AND and OR in that an AND and OR represent the intersection 
and union of sets, respectively. The p1.1obabilistic details of the intersections and 
unions of sets are discussed in Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974). 
The failure rates for the base components are generally considered to be 
independent and exponentially distrib111ted. The approximation to an exponential 
distribution is generally accepted since more complex failure rates can be shown to 
approach the exponential distribution as the number of components increase 
(Kapur and Lamberson, 1977). 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
System Selection 
A systems problem begins by defining the proper world view or system. A 
bucket elevator leg is the focus of this study since it is considered the most 
hazardous component of a grain handlilng facility (NMAB, 1982). Bucket elevators 
legs are reported to be involved in approximately 40% of all grain dust explosion 
incidence (USDA, 1980). In 1987, at least 8 of the 15 grain dust explosions (53%) 
were attributed to the bucket elevator leg (Clary, 1988). To further define the world 
view, system boundaries must be adequately defined and respected. The system 
boundaries in this particular application constitute, in part, the types of explosion 
prevention devices and which practice~ are applied to the elevator leg. 
The physical system is consider~d to be a bucket elevator leg in a grain 
handling facility. The physical system will be generic in the sense that it could have 
"all" possible elements of a bucket elevator legs as well as the application of "all" 
safety practices. This approach is chosen because of its versatility and general 
applicability to the grain handling industry. 
Specific operating characteristi¢s of the physical system are shown in Table 
II. The operating characteristics are a composite of typical elevators in Western 
Oklahoma. These operating characteristics are determined from a series of 
interviews with elevator managers in Western Oklahoma. A sample of the 
questionnaire used in the interviews is shown in Appendix B. Table ill presents 
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TABLE II 
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS 
OF MODEL ELEVATOR 
total throughput 
*turning rate 
number of legs 
leg capacio/ 
type of gram 
throughput/leg 
running time/leg 
**maintenance time 
bucket elevator season 
35,117 m3 (1,000,000 bu) 
5 
3 
229m3 /hr (6,500 bu/hr) 
wheat (#1 hard red winter) 
58,528 m3 (1,666,667 bu) 
256 hrs 
64 hrs 
320 hrs 
* includes grain entering, exiting, and 3 turns during storage 
* * equates to 0.25 times the running time per leg 
some of the findings of the survey. 
The total throughput is considered to be the amount of grain that the 
elevator will handle in a typical season1 The turning rate is defined as the number 
of times the incoming grain is moved through the elevator in a year. Movement of 
grain occurs when the grain is received and shipped out. Additional grain 
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movement occurs as a result of turning activities such as fumigation, moisture 
control and grading. The number of bucket elevator legs, bucket elevator leg 
capacity and grain type is characteristic of the grain handling facilities found in 
Western Oklahoma. Throughput per ]egis considered to be the amount of grain 
moved by each leg assuming the legs ate in a parallel arrangement and that the legs 
have identical utilization. The running time per leg is computed as the throughput 
per leg divided by the capacity of the leg. Maintenance time is assumed to be 0.25 
times the running time per leg. A bucket elevator leg season is defined as time in a 
given year that the leg is in operation plus the time it is subjected to maintenance 
activities. 
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TABLE ill 
OPERATING CHARACfERISTICS OF SURVEYED 
GRAIN ELEVATORS IN WESTERN OKLAHOMA 
standard samJ?le 
mean mode(s) median deviation SIZe 
turning 4.7 4.0 5.0 5.0 1.2 13 
rate 
leg 
height 44.1 36.6 44.2 45.7 44.2 7.5 11 
(m) 
number 
of legs 4.5 3 3 3.8 12 
annual 
throughput 40600 2640@ 28100 28300 13 
(m3) 
leg 
229 ca:Qacity 246 229 60.2 13 
(m3/hr) 
boot 
bearing 12.7 $ 10.5 8.6 6 
life 
(yrs) 
head 
bearing 14.2 $ 10 11.1 6 
life 
(yrs) 
welding and 
cutting 1.6 1 1 0.9 5 
frequency 
(yrs-1) 
Data Collection 
Sixteen country grain elevators ii.n Oklahoma were visited in the fall of 1987, 
to gain a better understanding of current practices and equipment used in such 
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facilities. Each elevator manager was interviewed to ascertain operating 
characteristics, equipment configurations, and other pertinent information about his 
particular facility. The results of these interviews were used to help identify the 
base events used as inputs to the model. 
Mechanical components, such as bearings, have an exponential failure rate 
distribution (Carter, 1972) and approximates of mean-time-to-failures (MTF) are 
readily available for various commerciCI!l and military applications (RADC, 1985). 
Craig and Johnson (1983) published typical replacement intervals for bearings 
commonly used in the grain industry. The difficulty in interpreting failure data, is 
caused by the variability in environme111tal conditions. The bearings on a bucket 
elevator leg are subjected to a harsh eDIVironment and common failure data is not 
available for comparable environmental conditions. 
CHAPTERV 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Models have been developed to describe failure processes in many 
industries. The chemical and mining industries have developed models describing 
the explosion phenomenon using a deterministic perspective. 
Fault Tree Development 
To determine the relationships between the various components, spatial 
configurations, safety programs and other aspects of the physical system, some form 
of fault tree analysis must be performed. This analysis technique is versatile and 
both qualitative and quantitative types of information are available. For these 
reasons fault tree analysis is selected fQr this study. 
Due to the physical arrangement of a bucket elevator leg, it may be divided 
into four distinct and independent sections. These sections are the boot (where the 
grain enters), head (where the grain exits), upside and downside. The system is 
further divided into normal elevator operation and maintenance operations. These 
divisions create eight independent sections of the system and consequently eight 
independent sections of the fault tree. 
The top event in the fault tree iS selected as the fault event "secondary grain 
dust explosion in a bucket elevator leg" and is designated as GO. This event will not 
occur unless a "primary explosion in a bucket elevator leg" occurs and "explosion 
suppression fails" and "explosion ventimg fails," designated as G 1, G2, and G3, 
respectively. Each of these events are further developed until only base events 
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appear at the bottom of the tree. A graphical representation of the tree is shown in 
Figures 3 through 13. Descriptions of the illustrated base events (i.e. BO, B1, etc.) 
and each secondary failure (i.e. GO, G 1, etc.) are listed in Appendix C and D, 
respectively. 
Assignment ~f Point Estimates 
Data, for failure rates of maintenance programs, do not exist for grain 
handling facilities. Data for componen~s commonly found in grain handling 
facilities are used in other industries but are confounded by the variability in 
environmental conditions. They are further confounded by the fact that a simple 
'failure' (such as bearing failure) will not insure an ignition source. Approximations 
of the point estimates were a result of such difficulties. A list of the point estimates 
of the base events shown in Figures 3 through 13 are listed in column 3 of Appendix 
c. 
Consider base events B69, B73, B87, B91, and B247 which represent the 
failure of bearings. Bearings, and othet mechanical components are reported to 
follow an exponential failure rate distribution as shown in Equation 3 (Carter, 
1972). 
where 
-(_!_) 
F(t) = 1- e 8 
F(t) = probability of failure at timet; 
t = time, (t); 
8 = mean time between failures, (t-1). 
(3) 
By using the relationship of reliability and failure as shown in Equations 1 and 2, the 
reliability function of the exponential d[stribution is show in Equation 4. 
~ 
Figure 3. Top of Fault Tree 
Figure 4. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary Explosion in Boot 
of Bucket Elevator Leg while Operating Normally N Ul 
Figure 5. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Ignition from Overheated Bearing 
in Boot of Bucket Elevator Leg while Operating Normally 
N 
0\ 
Figure 6. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary Explosion in Head 
of Bucket Elevator Leg while Operating Normally N -...J 
Figure 7. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Ignition from Overheated Bearing 
in Head of Bucket Elevator Leg while Operating Normally 
N 
00 
Figure 8. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary Explosion in Upside 
of Bucket Elevator Leg while Operating Normally N \0 
Figure 9. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary Explosion in Downside 
of Bucket Elevator Leg while Operating Normally w 0 
Figure 10. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary 
Explosion in Boot of Bucket Elevator 
Leg During Maintenance 
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Figure 11. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary 
Explosion in Head of Bucket Elevator 
Leg During Maintenance 
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Figure 12. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary 
Explosion in Upside of Bucket Elevator 
Leg During Maintenance 
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Figure 13. Portion of Fault Tree Describing Primary 
Explosion in Downside of Bucket Elevator 
Leg During Maintenance 
34 
where 
-(__!_) 
R(t) = e 9 
R(t) = reliability at timet; 
t = time, (t); 
9 = mean time between failures, (t-1). 
The point estimates of the probability of occurrence of each base event is 
actually the instantaneous failure rate, also known as the hazard function. The 
hazard function is defined as the limit of the failure rate as the time interval 
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(4) 
approaches 0. The hazard function is defined by Equation 5 (Barlow and Proschan, 
1975). 
where 
h(t) = lim 
~t~o 
R(t)- R(t+.o.O 
(~t)R(t) 
1 d 
= [- R(t)] 
R(t) dt 
= 
h(t) =hazard function at timet, (t-1); 
.o.t = time increment, (t); 
R(t) = reliability at timet; 
gt = derivative with respect to t. 
(5) 
The negative of the derivative with respect to time of the reliability function 
of the exponential distribution is given in Equation 6. 
= 
1 e-( ~) 
- _g_ R(t) 0' 0' 
dt (6) 
where 
gt = derivative with respect to t; 
R(t) = reliability at timet; 
t = time, (t); 
8 =mean time between failures, (t-1). 
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Equation 6 is recognized as the probability density function, f(t), of the exponential 
distribution. Therefore the hazard function is defined in Equation 7. 
where 
where 
h(t) = ~ 
R(t) 
h(t) = hazard function, (t-1); 
f(t) =probability density function, (c1); 
R(t) = reliability at timet. 
(7) 
The hazard function for the exponential distribution is shown in Equation 8. 
..1 -(..!._) 8 
h(t) = 9 e 
-(..!._) 
e 8 
=..1 
8 
= 
h( t) = hazard function, ( C 1); 
t = time, (t); 
8 = mean time between failures~ (t). 
(8) 
Craig and Johnson (1983) reported average replacement intervals for 
bearings to be approximately 13 years. Using the running time of 256 hours per year 
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per leg as specified for the model, results in a time to replacement of approximately 
3328 hours. A bearing failure, however will not occur as frequently as bearing 
replacement. It is assumed that a bearing replacement occurs at a rate of 5 times 
that of bearing failures resulting in a mean time to failure of 16,640 hrs. 
As previously stated this is confounded by the fact that only a portion of the 
failures are actually ignition sources. It is assumed that 2% of the failures will result 
in an ignition source from an over heat~d bearing, therefore the mean time to an 
ignition source is 832,000 hrs. The resulting point estimate of the probability of 
occurrence is 3.1 x 10-4 for base events IB69 and B87 using equation 3 with the value 
oft being 256 hrs. It is also assumed that an ignition source from a sparking or 
seized bearing will occur in 1% of the bearing failures resulting in a point estimate 
of the probability of occurrence of 3.1 >< w-5 for base events B73, B91, and B247. 
Software Development 
The W AM-E fault tree analysis software is used to perform the necessary 
calculations. W AM-E is a set of FORTRAN programs which finds the point 
estimation of the top event, determines; minimum cut sets of the input tree, and 
simulates a mathematically equivalent tnodel to determine information about the 
distribution of the top event. 
The cut set analysis used in WAM-E proceeds on the principle that a 
properly constructed fault tree can be described as a set of Boolean algebraic 
equations with the base events as independent variables and secondary events as 
dependent variables (EPRI, 1986). Thtough the manipulation of the principles of 
Boolean algebra, the top event can be ((iescribed as the sum-of-products of 
combinations of the base events. TheW AM-E code utilizes a bit manipulation 
scheme to process the Boolean algebra operations. 
The point estimation algorithm in WAM-E utilizes the inclusion-exclusion 
principle of the unions of sets. These sets are actually the minimum cut sets and 
their associated point estimations. 
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Consider a fault tree with top event E which has n minimum cut sets with the 
set of all minimum cut sets N, where N = {C1, ~, ... , Cn} with associate point 
estimates of {P(C1),P(C2), ... , PC(n)}. Via the definition of a minimum cut set 
n 
E = u ci 
i=1 
or 
But when considering point estimates 
n n i-1 
2_ P(CiCj) + 
j=1 
P(E) = 2_ P(Ci)- 2. 
i= 1 i=2 
n i-1 j-1 
+ 2. L I P(CiCjCk) - ... + 
i=3 j=2 k=1 
+ (-1) n-1 P(C1~C3 ... Cn) 
u~ (9) 
(10) 
(11) 
Care must be taken to judiciously assign cut off probabilities when using 
WAM-E. The number of calculations required to determine the point estimation of 
the top event can be very large if the number of mjnjmum cut sets is large. Consider 
the previous tree with n minimum cut sets. The number of calculations, Z, required 
to determine the point estimator can be determined as 
n n 
z = 2. <Y) = L: 
i=1 i=1 
n! (12) 
i!(n- i)! 
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Model Features 
The model includes 157 secondary events and 233 base events routed 
through 57 AND and 100 OR gates. The occurrence of each base event is assumed 
to be independent of any other base event. Input to the WAM-E program is shown 
in Appendix E. The first portion of the input describes the structure of the fault 
tree. The remainder of the input assigns each base event with a point estimate. 
The model is developed in a modular manner such that modifications can be 
made easily. The model is versatile in that various equipment, managerial and 
procedural aspects of a bucket elevator leg are easily implemented into the model. 
The acquisition of newly acquired data can be incorporated into the model with 
little difficulty. The model is an excellent starting point for further work in this area. 
The model can be described as immature in that portions of the model need 
to be verified and developed further. The most pronounced shortcoming of the 
model is the lack of data, much less that which is verifiable. The model needs to be 
refined to include more "field" data as it becomes available. 
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A fault tree analysis lends itself to both qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
The qualitative analysis includes the determination of the minimum cut sets which 
highlight critical base events representing failures in equipment or practices. The 
quantitative analysis includes the detellinination of the top event point estimation 
and the changes of this point estimation when different practices are included in the 
physical system. 
Minimum Cut Sets 
The minimum cut sets (the combinations of base events that will insure the 
occurrence of a secondary grain dust explosion) of the input fault tree with the 
highest probably of occurrence are listed in Table IV. Table IV lists the 6 minimum 
cut sets with the highest probability of occurrence of all combinations of events that 
lead to the occurrence of a secondary grain dust explosion in a bucket elevator leg. 
Consider minimum cut set No.1. Base event B135, shown in Figure 5, 
represents the failure of a maintenance activity leading to loss of lubrication leading 
to overheated bearing in the boot whil¢ operating normally. This event, logically, 
provides the necessary ignition source £or the occurrence of a primary grain dust 
explosion. Base event B134, shown in Figure 5, represents the unavailability of heat 
sensors. Had heat sensors been available, corrective action could have been taken. 
Likewise base events B128 and B124, shown in Figure 5, represent the unavailability 
of heat sensitive tape and heat sensitive paint, respectively. Base event B123, shown 
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Minimum cut set no. 
Probability of 
occurrence 
(x 10-5) 
Base events 
TABLE IV 
MINIMUM CUT SETS WITH HIGHEST 
PROBABIUTY OF OCCURRENCE 
1 2 3 4 
3.07 3.03 2.99 2.90 
BO BO BO BO 
B1 B1 Bl B1 
B4 B4 B4 B4 
BS B9 B5 B9 
B6 BlO B6 BlO 
B23 B31 B23 B31 
B24 B32 B24 B32 
B25 B33 B25 B33 
BA BB BA BB 
B26 B34 B26 B34 
B123 B146 B69 B87 
B124 B149 B124 B146 
B128 B150 B128 B149 
B134 B158 B134 B150 
B135 B161 
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5 6 
2.61 2.61 
BO BO 
B1 Bl 
B4 BS 
B5 B6 
B6 B23 
B23 B24 
B24 B25 
B25 BA 
BA B26 
B26 B123 
B123 B128 
B124 B134 
B134 B135 
B135 B241 
B239 B242 
B240 
in Figure 5, represents the unavailability of a auto-lubrication unit which would have 
alleviated the dependence of the maintenance activities. 
Base events B23, B24, B25, BA and B26, shown in Figure 4, represent the 
occurrence of fuel in the boot while the elevator is operating normally. Events B5 
and B6, confinement in boot and oxygen in boot, respectively, are also shown in 
Figure 4. These events are necessary fbr the occurrence of a primary grain dust 
explosion and occur in each minimum cut set which results in a primary explosion 
in the boot while the elevator is operating normally. The primary events BO, Bland 
B4 are shown in Figure 3. The occurrence of BO indicates that normal elevator 
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operation is taking place, Bl indicates that explosion vents are not in use and B4 
indicates that explosion suppression is not in use. Events B1 and B4, which occur in 
each minimum cut set, insure that a secondary explosion will occur. 
Appendix F lists all of the minimum cut set with probability of occurrence 
greater that 1 x 10·8. Base event descriptions are listed in Appendix C. Using the 
cut off probability of 1 x 10-8, 408 miniJinum cut sets are identified. As the cut off 
probability is decreased the number of minimum cut sets identified increases. A cut 
off probability of 1 x 10-9 resulted in over 700 minimum cut sets yet did not affect 
the top event probability. 
Top Event Point Estimation 
The union of all minimum cut s¢ts represents the occurrence of a top event. 
Therefore, the point estimation for the top of the fault tree (the occurrence of a 
secondary grain dust explosion in a bucket elevator leg) is computed by 
incorporating the point estimations of each minimum cut set into Equation 11. The 
resulting point estimation is 8.6 x 10·4. This result suggests that approximately 9 
secondary grain dust explosion in a bucket elevator leg will occur per 10,000 bucket 
elevator leg seasons. 
The United States has approximately 14,000 grain handling facilities that can 
be described as either country, terminail, or export elevators (Federal Register, 
1987). If it is assumed that each facility operates three bucket elevator legs, there 
are 42,000 bucket elevator leg seasons per year. According to the model there will 
be approximately 8.6 grain dust explosions per ten thousand bucket elevator leg 
seasons. The model therefore predicts that there will be 36.1 grain dust explosions 
per year occurring in bucket elevator legs. This compares to an average of actually 
10.7 explosions per year from 1980 through 1987 when the actual number of 
occurrences (reported to be 21.4 as shown in Table I) is multiplied by the estimated 
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percent of occurrences (50%) attributable to the bucket elevator leg. 
A grain handling facility can measure its risk of a secondary grain dust 
explosion in the following manner. Consider a facility which has three (3) bucket 
elevator legs. The facility therefore experiences 3 bucket elevator seasons per year. 
A grain dust explosion could occur in any of the 3 legs. Therefore the probability of 
an explosion, P(E), can be calculated u$ing Equation 11 and the point estimation of 
8.6 x w-4 for each of the 3 elevator legs. The resulting probability, P(E) = 
2.6 x 10-3, means that the facility has a 0.26% (1 in 390) chance of a secondary grain 
dust explosion in any of the 3 elevator legs in a season. 
A grain handling facility can als0 effectively evaluate the practicality of 
installing safety equipment or incorporating safety procedures in its operation. The 
results of the cut set analysis indicates tlhat absence of explosion vents (B 1 ), 
explosion suppression devices (B4) and bearing heat sensors (B134 and B146) 
contribute greatly to the occurrence of a secondary grain dust explosion. Table V 
shows the change in the top event probability if any combinations of these practices 
are incorporated into a bucket elevator leg. In other words, the input tree uses 0.0 
as point estimators for B1, B4, B134 and B146. 
Sensitilvity Analysis 
The top event point estimate is dependent on the point estimates of the base 
events. The point estimates of selected base events are varied to determine the 
effect on the point estimate of the top event. The base events are identified as 
failures attributable to either personnel, housekeeping, maintenance, fuel, or 
bearings. These groups of failures are chosen because of there inherent relationship 
to the physical system. These failures are controllable and influenced by 
management decisions. 
TABLEV 
PROBABILITY OF A SECONDARY GRAIN DUST EXPLOSION 
WHEN THE MODEL BUCKET ELEVATOR LEG IS EQUIPPED 
WITH EXPLOSION SUPPRESSION DEVICES, EXPLOSION 
VENTS AND/OR HEAT SENSORS 
Equipment configuration 
Unequipped leg 
Heat sensors 
Explosion suppression 
Explosion vents 
Explosion suppression 
AND 
Heat sensors 
Explosion vents 
AND 
Heat sensors 
Top event probability 
8.6 x w-4 
8.5 x w-5 
9.9 x w-5 
1.1 x w-7 
9.9 x w-6 
1.1 x w-8 
Table VI list the specific base events altered in this procedure. Figures 14-
18 illustrate the change in the probability of a secondary grain dust explosion as a 
function of each of these classes of failures. The dashed marker on the curve 
indicates the assigned point estimation of the base events and the probability of 
occurrence of the top event as determi.ned by the model. 
Personnel 
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Base events designated as personnel include those failures associated with 
acknowledging failed states of the system. These failed states include such items as 
not correcting a misaligned or slipping !belt but do not include ignition sources 
directly caused by personnel. The probability of occurrence of personnel failures is 
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TABLE VI 
BASE EVENTS USED IN SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
personnel B94 B109 B154 Bl80 B201 B202 B211 B212 
housekeeping B240 B242 B244 B246 B249 
maintenance B135 B147 B161 B173 
bearings B69 B73 B81 B91 B247 
fuel B23 B24 B25 BA B31 B32 B33 BB 
B39 B40 B41 BC B47 B48 B49 BD 
varied from 0 to 1. Figure 14 shows th¢ change in the probability of secondary grain 
dust explosion as a function of the probability of a personnel failure. The nature of 
the curve indicates a positive relationsb.ip between elevator personnel acting as 
detecting agents and the probability of a secondary grain dust explosion. 
The range of values on the X-axis shown on Figure 14 extends beyond 
reasonable expectations of personnel aJt grain handling facilities, but examining the 
entire range reveals the dependency of the top event probability on the probability 
of occurrence of personnel failures as ilt approaches its extremes. Changing the 
probability of occurrence of a personnel failure by 0.1 results in a 1.1 x 10-4 change 
in the top event probability over the entire range of the probability scale. 
The probability of occurrence of personnel failures used in the model is 0.2. 
This probability is affected by management and educational programs provided 
grain elevator personnel. The exact ptiobability of occurrence of personnel failures 
associated with a particular grain handlling facility is highly dependent on these and 
other considerations. 
PROBABILITY 
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TOP 1x1o 
EVENT 
1x1 04 .___ _ __..__ __ ___,.. ___ ___._ __ ____._ __ __. 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
PROBABILITY' OF PERSONNEL FAILURES 
Figure 14. Effect of the Probability of Failures Attributable to 
Personnel on the Probability of a Secondary Grain 
Dust Explosion 
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Figure 15. Effect of the Probability of Failures Attributable to 
Housekeeping on the Probability of a Secondary 
Grain Dust Explosion 
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Figure 16. Effect of the Probability of Failures Attributable to 
Maintenance on the Probability of a Secondary 
Grain Dust Explosion 
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PROBABILITY OF BEARING FAILURES 
Figure 17. Effect of the Probability of Failures Attributable to 
Bearings on the Probability of a Secondary Grain 
Dust Explosion 
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Figure 18. Effect of the Probability of Failures Attributable to 
Fuel on the Probability of a Secondary Grain Dust 
Explosion 
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Housekeeping 
Base events designated as housekeeping failures include those failures 
associated with keeping boot and head bearings free of dust. This is even more 
critical when use is made of visual heat sensing devices such as heat sensitive tape or 
paint. The curve shown in Figure 15 suggests that housekeeping has little effect on 
the probability of a secondary grain dust explosion. This is explained by the 
definition of the physical system beirtg only the bucket elevator leg and therefore, 
housekeeping efforts do little to minimize dust concentrations internal to the leg. 
This should not suggest, however, that housekeeping efforts should be minimized 
since good housekeeping has beneficial influences in other areas of the grain 
handling facility. 
The probability of occurrence of housekeeping failures used in the model is 
0.85. Particular grain handling facilities may experience different probabilities of 
occurrence of housekeeping failures but it is likely that most probabilities of 
occurrence of housekeeping failures will fall between 0.6 and 0.9. This range of 
probabilities produce top event probabilities of 7.0 X 10-4 and 9.1 X 10-4. This small 
difference (approximately 2 secondacy grain dust explosion per 10,000 bucket 
elevator leg seasons) indicates that the probability of occurrence of housekeeping 
failures is not critical in this study. 
Maintenance 
Base events designated as maintenance failures include those failures 
associated with maintenance procedlures of bearings. The probability of occurrence 
of the base events is varied from 3.2S X w-7 to 3.25 X w-2. The range of values on 
the X-axis shown in Figure 16, includes the reasonable expectations of maintenance 
programs. Examining this range reVieals the tendency of the top event probability as 
the probability of occurrence of maintenance failures approach extremes. A ten-
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fold change in the probability of occurrence of maintenance failures used in the 
model results in a significant change in the top event probability. A probability of 
occurrence of maintenance failures of 3.25 x 10-5 result in a top event probability of 
occurrence of 4.9 x 10-4, while a probability of occurrence of 3.25 x 10-3 results in a 
top event probability of occurrence of 4.2 x 10-3. 
Realizing a ten-fold change in the probability of occurrence of maintenance 
failures may not be practical. The inherent variability of the initial estimate of the 
probability of occurrence of maintenance failures, however, suggest that this range 
(3.25 x 10-5 through 3.25 x 10-3) is large enough to include realistic values. Also this 
range is adequate to include most probabilities of occurrence of maintenance 
failures found throughout the grain hiandling industry. 
The curve shown in Figure 161 indicates that the probability of a secondary 
grain dust explosion increases significantly as the probability of a maintenance 
failure increases, especially beyond 3~25 x 10-4. This result emphasizes the need for 
a comprehensive maintenance program to keep the probability of a maintenance 
failure below 3.25 x 104 . 
Bearings 
The probability of occurrence of bearing failures is varied from 3.1 x 10-7 to 
3.1 x 10-2. The range of values on the X-axis shown in Figure 17 includes the 
reasonable expectations of the probaJbility of occurrence of bearing failures. 
Examining this range reveals the dependency of the top event probability on the 
probability of occurrence of a bearing failure as it approaches its extremes. 
Decreasing the probability of occurrence of a bearing failure from 3.1 x 104 to 
3.1 x 10-5 (a ten-fold decrease) decr¢ases the top event probability of occurrence 
from 8.6 x 104 to 5.1 x 104 , a decrease of approximately 3 secondary grain dust 
explosions per 10,000 bucket elevator leg seasons. Increasing the probability of 
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occurrence of a bearing failure from 3.1 x 10-4 to 3.1 x w-3 (a ten-fold increase) 
increases the top event probability of o¢currence from 8.6 X 10-4 to 2.4 X 10-3, an 
increase of more than 64 secondary grain dust explosions per 10,000 bucket elevator 
leg seasons. 
The base events designated as fuel include the type of grain, grade of grain, 
speed of transport, and type of aspiration system. The probability of occurrence of 
fuel is varied from 0.1 to 1.0. The range of values on the X-axis shown in Figure 18 
includes the reasonable expectations o£ what can be expected for the probability of 
occurrence of fuel. Examining this range reveals the tendency of the top event 
probability as the probability of occurr¢nce of fuel approaches extremes. 
Decreasing the probability of occurrence of fuel from 0.6 to 0.5 decreases the 
probability of occurrence of the top ev¢nt from 8.6 x 10-4 to 4.1 x w-4. This is a 
decrease of 4.5 secondary grain dust explosions per 10,000 bucket elevator leg 
seasons. likewise an increase in the pitobability of occurrence of fuel from 0.6 to 0.7 
increases the probability of the top eveht from 8.6 x 10-4 to 1.6 x w-4, an increase of 
approximately 31 secondary grain dust explosions per 10,000 bucket elevator leg 
seasons. 
The results indicate that a signi:tlicant decrease in the probability of a 
secondary grain dust explosion can be achieved with a decrease in the probability of 
occurrence of fuel. This is significant in that the proper use and design of aspiration 
systems can significantly improve the safety of a grain handling facility. Other dust 
abatement activities such as the use of nrineral oil additives would also significantly 
decrease the probability of fuel in a bucket elevator leg. 
The probability of occurrence of fuel in any particular grain handling facility 
is highly variable depending on the factors previously mentioned. Grain handling 
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facilities which transport different types or grades of grain, use different aspiration 
techniques or conveying speeds will experience different probabilities of occurrence 
of fuel. 
Model Characteristics 
The model predicts that there wiU be approximately 36.1 secondary grain 
dust explosions in a bucket elevator season. The model prediction over estimates 
the reported occurrences of secondary grain dust explosions in bucket elevator legs 
by a factor of approximately 3.4. The over prediction of the model is not 
unexpected given the conservative assig~ent of point estimates of base events due 
to lack of verifiable input data, lack of validation of the model, and the possibility of 
inconsistent reporting procedures of grain dust explosion incidence. 
Failure rate information about components and practices found in the grain 
handling industry, for the most part, does not exist. This void of data leads to 
approximations of many of the point estimates needed to perform the qualitative 
analysis of the grain dust explosion prolblem. These approximations are based on 
individual experience and inferences fr~m interviews with managers of grain 
elevators in Western Oklahoma. 
The model has not been validated to determine where corrections should be 
made. At this point in the model development, the model has not been tested 
against historical data of explosion incidence. Further refinement of the model will 
increase the accuracy of the results. 
CHAPTER Vll 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE GRAIN 
HANDLING INDUSTRY 
The results of this analysis lend themselves to several suggestions for the 
grain handling industry. The suggestions include installing equipment designed to 
protect facilities from devastating grain dust explosions as well as managerial 
aspects of operating a grain handling facility. 
The sensitivity analysis identifie$ three classes of failures that greatly affect 
the probability of a secondary grain dust explosions. These areas are: 1) fuel 
(aerated grain dust), 2) bearings, and 3) maintenance. Any activity that will reduce 
the probability of these failures will be of great benefit. 
Fuel 
Aerated grain dust in a bucket elevator leg is affected by: 1) type of grain 
being transported, 2) grade of grain being transported, 3) speed of transport, and 4) 
type of aspiration system. The type of grain being transported is governed by the 
predominant crops in the geographic atea and it is not practical to only transport 
rice, for example, because of the low organic content of rice dust. Likewise grain 
handling facilities have limited control on the grade of grain entering their facility. 
The speed of transport can be c(>ntrolled by installing low-speed high 
capacity elevator legs. These legs provide equal capacity while creating less dust 
due to reduced kernel damage. The dust in the grain mass is also retained in the 
grain mass upon exit from the head because the grain falls enmass instead of being 
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hurled from the head. 
Aspiration systems should be engineered to remove dust from the elevator 
housing. Poorly designed systems aid the entrainment of the dust by providing a 
turbulent atmosphere. Further research in this area is needed to adequately address 
design considerations including air flow rate, location, and configuration of 
aspirators in order to develop a system that will provide adequate aspiration for 
bucket elevator legs. 
Aerated grain dust can also be reduced by using mineral oil additives for the 
suppression of aerated dust. These additives cause dust particles to adhere to the 
surface of the grain kernel preventing them from becoming airborne thus 
eliminating the attached dust as a fuel source. 
Bearings 
The proper selection and installation of bearings cannot be over emphasized. 
A slight increase in the probability of bearing failures significantly increases the 
probability of a grain dust explosion. Managers of grain handling facilities should 
strive to improve their current situation and should continue to emphasize the 
importance of bearing management. Management means strict and comprehensive 
maintenance and inspection programs, as well as the initiation of preventive 
maintenance programs. 
Maintenance 
The probability of a secondary grain dust explosions is sensitive to the 
probability of maintenance failures. Maintenance in grain handling facilities can be 
improved by giving it a high priority thtoughout the elevator season and not just in 
the pre-season. Well established maintenance programs systematically cover the 
physical facility on a regular, predetermined sc~edule. Maintenance records are 
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crucial to identify and correct weaknesses in the program. Knowledgeable, well-
trained personnel are needed to propedy carry out the maintenance activities. The 
installation of automatic lubrication units can assist the maintenance program, but 
are not a substitute for the maintenance program. 
Equipment 
The benefits of installing bearing heat sensors, explosion suppression devices, 
and/or explosion vents are demonstrated in this analysis. Adhering to the " ... ounce 
of prevention ... " philosophy, it is essentlial to incorporate bearing heat sensors. 
These sensors, when properly installed, can accurately identify potential problem 
bearings that could ignite a grain dust ¢xplosion. Incorporating bearing heat sensors 
with explosion vents will greatly reduce the probability of a grain dust explosion. 
Explosion vents may not be practical in every situation (e.g. an interior leg) but 
explosion suppression devices provide an equally effective alternative where 
possible. 
CHAPTER VITI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The occurrence of a secondary grain dust explosion in a bucket elevator leg is 
studied using the fault tree analysis technique. This particular analysis lends itself to 
this type of risk analysis by determining the combinations of events leading to a 
failure, the overall probability, and the sensitivity to variations in the input of base 
event probabilities of occurrence. 
Each base event is assigned a pmint estimate of its probability of failure based 
on published failure rate data and from interviews with grain elevator managers in 
Oklahoma. The minimum cut sets of the fault tree are determined which identify 
the combinations of events necessary tCI> cause a secondary grain dust explosion in a 
bucket elevator leg. This analysis reveals that the lack of 1) adequate bearing 
maintenance, 2) explosion suppression devices, 3) explosion venting and 4) bearings 
equipped with heat sensors all contribute significantly to the occurrence of 
secondary explosions. 
The total probability of a secondary grain dust explosion in a bucket elevator 
leg is predicted to be 8.6 x w-4 with the assumed point estimates. This overall 
probability indicates that a typical grain handling facility has a 0.26% chance of 
suffering a secondary grain dust explosiion in a bucket elevator leg. Incorporating 
explosion suppression devices, explosic!m vents or bearing heat sensors will 
appreciably decrease this probability tCI> 1.7 x 10-8 or a 5.1 x 10-6% chance for a 
typical facility. 
It is evident from the sensitivity analysis that the probability of aerated grain 
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dust in a concentration above the mininmm explosive concentration (fuel) in the 
bucket elevator leg, failure of bearings, and maintenance procedures have a most 
profound affect on the probability of a secondary grain dust explosion. Substantial 
reduction in the probability of a grain dust explosion can be realized if the 
probability of fuel can be reduced. This analysis also shows that the neglect of 
bearings and maintenance programs can significantly increase the probability of a 
grain dust explosion. 
Specific conclusions for the model development are as follows: 
1) Using Fault Tree Analysis and interviews with Oklahoma grain elevator 
managers, a model was developed by; 
a) Identifying the known events leading to a secondary grain dust explosion 
(the fault tree). 
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b) Expressing the occurrence o£ a secondary grain dust explosion in terms of 
combinations of events (minimum cut sets of the fault tree). 
c) Assigning a point estimate of the probability of failure to each base event 
of the fault tree, determining which combinations of events are most likely to 
occur and ranking the minimum cut sets of the fault tree as to their 
probability of occurrence. 
2) The W AM-E computer program was used to compute the total probability of a 
secondary grain dust explosion to be 8.6 X 10-4. This probability is largely 
influenced by the use of bearing heat sensors, explosion suppression devices or 
explosion vents which reduces the probability of failure to 8.5 x lo-5, 9.9 x lo-5 and 
1.7 x lo-7, respectively. Using bearing heat sensors in combination with explosion 
suppression devices decreases the probability of a secondary grain dust explosion to 
9.9 x w-6. Using bearing heat sensors in combination with explosion vents 
decreases the probability of a secondary grain dust explosion to 1.7 x w-8. 
3) The model is useful in that it can easily; 
a) Accept new data. 
b) Be modified to accommodate various equipment, managerial and 
procedural differences. 
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c) Be used on a wide range of bucket elevator legs in grain handling facilities. 
4) The inadequacies of the model are due to; 
a) Lack of verifiable input data. 
b) Verification through historical data is needed. 
A sensitivity analysis revealed that maintenance and bearings have a large 
influence on the probability of occurrence of a secondary grain dust explosion while 
fuel, personnel and housekeeping influence to a lesser degree. Specific conclusions 
of the sensitivity analysis are as follows: 
1) A change of 0.1 in the probability of occurrence of personnel failures results in a 
1.1 x 10-4 change in the probability of a secondary grain dust explosion. 
2) Housekeeping failures have little effect on the probability of a secondary grain 
dust explosion in a bucket elevator leg because they do little to minimize dust 
concentrations internal to the leg. Most grain handling facility should experience a 
probability of a secondary grain dust eJqJlosion between 7.0 x 10-4 and 9.1 x 10-4 as 
affected by housekeeping failures. 
3) Increasing the probability of occurrence of a maintenance failure by a factor of 
ten results in 139 secondary grain dust explosions per 10,000 bucket elevator leg 
seasons. likewise, decreasing the probability of occurrence of a maintenance 
failure by a factor of ten results in approximately 15 secondary grain dust explosions 
per 10,000 bucket elevator leg seasons .. This compares to approximately 8.6 
secondary grain dust explosions per 10~000 bucket elevator leg seasons when the 
probability of occurrence of a maintenance failure is 3.25 x 10-5. 
4) Increasing the probability of occurrence of a bearing failure by a factor of ten 
results in approximately 24 secondary grain dust explosions per 10,000 bucket 
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elevator leg seasons. Likewise, decreasing the probability of occurrence of a 
bearing failure by a factor of ten results in approximately 5 secondary grain dust 
explosions per 10,000 bucket elevator leg seasons. This compares to approximately 
8.6 secondary grain dust explosions per 10,000 bucket elevator leg seasons when the 
probability of occurrence of a maintenance failure is 3.1 x 10-4. 
5) Decreasing the probability of occurrence of fuel from 0.6 to 0.5 decreases the 
probability of a secondary grain dust explosion from 8.6 x 10-4 to 4.1 x 10-4. 
Increasing the probability of occurren~e of fuel from 0.6 to 0.7 increases the 
probability of a secondary grain dust explosion from 8.6 x 10-4 to 1.6 x 10-3. 
The results of this analysis lead to the following suggestions for the grain 
handling industry. 
1) Control the amount of aerated dust (fuel) inside the bucket elevator leg by using 
slower transport speeds, effectively designed aspiration systems and dust suppressing 
additives on the grain. 
2) Proper selection, use, installation, i!nspection and maintenance of bearings 
should not be compromised. 
3) Maintenance programs should be given a higher priority in that the programs 
adhere to a regular and predetermined schedule of inspections, repairs and 
replacements of components. 
4) Bearing heat sensors and, depending on bucket elevator leg configuration, 
explosion vents or explosion suppression devices should be equipped on all bucket 
elevator legs. 
CHAPTER IX 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The modeling processes is dependent on the availability of data. Failure 
data for components and practices used in the grain handling industry are scarce at 
best. Efforts should be increased to coUect and disseminate failure data for 
components and practices found in grain handling facilities. 
Data should be collected in the following areas: 
1) Bearing failure data. Craig and Johnson (1983) solicited information 
from grain handlers about replacement intervals for bearing. These data should be 
reinforced with additional testing of bearings in the field and laboratory subjected to 
the environmental condition found in a grain handling facility. 
2) Detection and sensing equipment. Detection and sensing equipment 
provide a great service to the grain halildling industry. The prevailing attitude of 
managers of grain handling facilities is that these devices are unreliable and add 
little to the safety of the facility. Demonstrating the reliability of these components 
will provide data for input to this model and gain the confidence of elevator 
managers. 
3) Maintenance activities. The reliability of individual maintenance 
programs is needed to evaluate their effectiveness. This data can be collected by 
examining detailed maintenance logs and comparing them to the specifications of 
equipment manufactures. The data should also include the frequency of general 
maintenance activities as well as specific activities such as welding and cutting 
activities, use of power tools, housekeeping activities, and inspections of belting, 
62 
bearings, etc. 
4) Occurrence of grain dust explosions. Grain dust explosion information 
needs to be detailed in such a way that would insure that all incidence of a grain 
dust explosion would be reported, the origin of the explosion can be identified, and 
the history of the facility is evident. 
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The model describing the occurrence of a secondary grain dust explosion in a 
bucket elevator leg should be improved with newly obtained data. Information 
about the distribution of the point estinn.ation of the probability of a secondary grain 
dust explosion should be investigated. '1fhis is possible via a Monte Carlo simulation 
of a mathematically equivalent model of the fault tree using theW AM-E computer 
software. 
The model should be verified. The verification can be accomplished by 
studying grain dust explosion data and developing a probability of occurrence by 
incorporating historical information about each damaged facility. Using reliability 
techniques, a mean-time-to-failure can he computed. This mean-time-to-failure can 
be compared to the probability of occurrence determined by the model. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLE OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE 
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EXAMPLE OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE 
The following is an example of how Fault Tree Analysis is used to 
systematically decompose a system. A simple system is analyzed and a fault tree is 
constructed, the minimum cut sets are determined, point estimates are assigned to 
the base events and the top event point 1estimate is determined. The symbols used 
in the construction of the fault tree in this example are shown in Figure 2. 
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Consider the simple circuit shown in Figure 19. It is assumed that all 
connections are functional. The first step in this analysis is to chose the top event or 
undesirable state of the system to be considered. The top event is considered to be 
that the light bulb will not function and is denoted as shown in Figure 20. 
It is recognized that the light bullb will not function if there is no current to 
the light bulb or the light bulb is faulty. These states of the system are added to the 
fault tree as shown in Figure 21. The failed light bulb is considered a base event. 
Event Gl must be further developed. For there to be no current to the light 
bulb, there must be no current through switch #1 and no current through switch #2. 
These events, denoted as G2 and G3, respectively, are shown in Figure 22. 
There are two situations that can result in there being no current through 
switch #1. First, switch #1 could fail open, or second, the battery could fail. 
Likewise for there to be no current through switch #2, the switch could fail open, or 
the battery could fail. The resulting strUcture of the fault tree is shown in Figure 23. 
Each of these events are considered base events and need no further development. 
The fault tree is now completed since the bottom leaves of the tree are all base 
events. 
The minimum cut sets can now be determined from the completed tree. To 
find the minimum cut sets, the tree mu$t be decomposed from the top downward. 
Consider gate GO. 
SWITCH#1 
SWITCH#2 
LIGHT 
BULB 
BATTERY 
Figure 19. Simple Circuit for Example 
Problem 
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GO= LIGHT BULB WILL NOT FUNCTION 
Figure 20. Top Event of Example Fault Tree 
LB =LIGHT BULB, FAILS 
G1 = NO CURRENT TO LIGHT BULB 
Figure 21. First Level Development of 
Example Fault Tree 
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G2 =NO CURRENT THROUGH SWITCH#1 
G3 =NO CURRENT THROUGH SWITCH#2 
Figure 22. Second Level Development of 
Exampl¢ Fault Tree 
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8 =BATIERY FAILS 
S1 =SWITCH#1 FAILS OPEN 
S2 =SWITCH#2 FAILS OPEN 
Figure 23. Completed Example Fault Tree 
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GO 
Gate GO proceeds from an OR gate, therefore GO is replaced with each 
event immediately preceding the OR gate. In this example GO is replaced by events 
LB and Gl. 
LB 
G1 
Event LB is a base event and proceeds from no gate, therefore it will not be 
further decomposed. Event G 1 proceeds from an AND gate, therefore G 1 is 
replaced with each event preceding the AND gate and expanded along the same 
row of the array. In this example G1 iS replaced with events G2 and G3. 
LB 
G2 G3 
Gate G2 proceeds from an OR gate, therefore G2 is replaced with each 
event immediately preceding the OR gate. In this example G2 is replaced by events 
Band Sl. 
LB 
B G3 
S1 G3 
Gate G3 also proceeds from an OR gate, therefore G3 is replaced with each 
event immediately preceding the OR gJate. In this example G3 is replaced by events 
B and S2 and the resulting cut sets are 
LB 
B B 
S1 S2 
Since each member of the cut sets is a base event all of the cut sets have been 
determined. 
Consider the cut set containing B and B. The definition of a cut set states 
that the base events of a cut set are related by the intersection of the events. The 
intersection of B AND B is logically just B. Therefore this set is minimized by 
reducing the cut set to simply the event B. The minimum cut sets are therefore 
LB 
B 
S1 S2 
The minimum cut sets are used by identifying which combinations of events 
will produce the top event. In this example, the light bulb will not function if ( 1) 
the light bulb is failed, (2) the battery is failed or (3) switch #1 and switch #2 fail 
open. 
The probability of occurrence for each base event is listed in Table VI. 
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The probability of occurrence of each minimum cut set is computed using Equation 
11 and shown in Table Vll. 
TABLE VII 
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF BASE 
EVENTS IN EXAMPLE PROBLEM 
LB 0.001 
B 0.0001 
S1 0.00005 
S2 0.00005 
The probability of occurrence of the top event is computed using Equation 
11 and the probability of occurrence of each minimum cut set. The resulting 
probability of occurrence of the top event is 1.2 x 10-3. 
TABLEVIT 
MINIMUM CUT SETS OF EXAMPLE PROBLEM WITII 
HIGHEST PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE 
minimum cut set no. 1 2 3 
probability of 
occurrence 0.001 0;0001 0.0001 
base events LB B S1 
S2 
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APPENDIXB 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN INTERVIEWS OF GRAIN 
ELEVATOR OPERATORS IN WESTERN OKLAHOMA 
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Name of Facility: -----------------------
TypeofFacility: -------------~----------------------------
Location: ---------------------------
Date of Interview: -----------------------
Name of Contact: ------------------------
Position of Contact: -----------------------
PhoneNumber: -------~------------------
80 
Questionnaire 
I. General information: 
IT. 
ill. 
1. How old is your facility? 
----
2. How many elevator legs are in your facility? __ _ 
3. What is your typical annual throughput? __ _ 
4. What is your typical in-house turning rate? __ _ 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Leg information: 
Are any legs adjacent to grain driers or conditioners? __ _ 
If so, briefly describe. 
What is the range of nominal leg belt speeds? __ _ 
What is the range of nominal heights of the legs? 
---
What is the range of the nominal capacities of the legs? 
---
Belt information: 
What is the belt materia]? 
---
How often do you inspect the belt? __ _ 
Briefly describe how you inspect the belt. 
Briefly describe how the belt is repaired (include repair material). 
How often do you replace the belt? __ _ 
Briefly describe how you determine when to replace the belt. 
Are your elevator leg drives or boot pulleys or belts equipped with any 
type of sensors or monit~rs? 
If so, briefly describe. ---
16. Do you have backstops (anti-rotational devices) installed on all legs to 
prevent ''back legging"? _____ _ 
If no, why not? 
IV. Bucket/Cup information: 
17. What is the bucket/cup material? 
----
18. How are the buckets/cups fastened to the belt? 
----
19. How often are buckets/cups replaced? 
----
20. Describe how dislodged buckets/ cups are detected. 
21. Describe how dislodged buckets are removed. 
22. Describe the bucket/ cup replacement procedure. 
V. Bearings, General: 
23. Who do you ask for technical bearing specifications? ____ _ 
24. What bearing manufacturer do you primarily use? 
----
Concerning boot/head bearings what/who is the: 
Boot Head 
25. Manufacturer 
26. Service Life 
27. Material 
28. Rating 
29. Lubrication 
VI. Bearings, Boot: 
30. Are the boot bearings external to the elevator housing? 
If no, why not? ----
31. Describe your boot bearfug maintenance policy. 
32. Des~be your boot beari!ng replac~ment policy, inc_luding 
specificatiOns on replacement beanngs (seals, beanngs, 
lubrication, duty, etc). 
33. What is the boot bearing, replacement interval? 
----
34. Are the boot bearings eqpipped with monitors? ___ _ 
If so: 
a) What type? 
-----;. 
b) Who is the manufacturer/model number? 
----
c) Describe your boot bearing monitor maintenance procedure. 
d) What is the replacement interval of the (boot) bearing monitors? 
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VII. Bearings, Head: 
35. Are the head bearings external to the elevator housing? 
If no, why not? ----
36. Describe your head beariing maintenance policy. 
37. Describe your head bearilng replacement policy. 
38. What is the head bearing; replacement interval? ___ _ 
39. Are the head bearings equipped with monitors? ___ _ 
If so: 
a) What type? ___ ~ 
b) Who is the manufacturer /model number? 
----
c) Describe your bearing monitor maintenance procedures. 
d) What is the replacement interval of the head bearing monitors? 
VIII. Pits: 
40. Number of pits? 
41. Method of transfer from pit? 
42. Size of grate openings? 
43. Equipped with magnets?' 
If so: 
a) What type and size of magnets are used? 
Rail Truck 
b) Describe how the magnets are cleaned and the cleaning interval. 
c) Describe the types of metals collected. 
d) How effective do you feel your pit magnets are? 
IX. Explosion Vents: 
44. What percent of legs are equipped with explosion vents? ___ _ 
45. What is the rated relief pressure of the vents? __ _ 
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46. Describe the location of the vents. 
47. What are the vent sizes? 
----
48. Describe any maintenan~e operations performed on the vents. 
49. How effective are your vents? 
X. Explosion Suppression: 
50. What percent of legs are 1equipped with explosion suppression 
devices? 
----
51. What type of suppression agent is used? ___ _ 
52. What is the operating pressure of the suppression agent? 
---
53. What type of pressure sensors are used? 
----
54. Who is the manufacture/model of the sensors? 
----
55. What is the activation pressure of the system? ___ _ 
56. Describe the location of the pressure sensors. 
57. Describe the location of the outlet jets. 
58. Describe any maintenan~e operations performed on the explosion 
suppression system. 
59. How effective is your explosion suppression system? 
XI. Dust Control, Ventilation: 
60. Describe the location of aspirators inside the elevator legs. 
61. What is the volumetric air flow rate inside the elevator legs? 
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62. What is the nominal working pressure of the ventilation system on the 
inside of the elevator leg~ ___ _ 
63. What type of dust/air stream separation device is used? 
----
64. How effective is your ventilation system? 
XII. Dust Control, Additives: 
65. What type of dust contra[ additives do you use? 
----
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
XIII. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
What is the application rate? 
----
At what point in the facility are the additives applied? __ _ 
Describe how the additives are applied to the grain. 
How effective are the dust control additives? 
Elevator Leg Operating Procedures: 
Describe the elevator leg; start-up procedures (including control 
interlocks if used). 
Describe the elevator leg shut-down procedures (including control 
interlocks if used). 
Describe the major elevan:or leg maintenance procedures. 
Do welding and cutting operations take place in or around the 
elevator leg? How often? 
-----
Describe safeguards used when welding and cutting operations take 
place. 
XIV. General: 
75. Are the elevator legs equipped with opacity sensors? ___ _ 
If so, describe. 
76. Are the elevator legs equipped with heat detectors? ___ _ 
If so, describe. 
77. Are the elevator legs equipped with smoke detectors? 
If so, describe. ----
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BASE 
EVENT POINT* 
ID BASE EVENT DESCRIPTION ESTIMATION 
BA Speed of transport in boot while ndrmal. 0.6 
BB Speed of transport in head while normal. 0.6 
BC Speed of transport in upside while normal. 0.6 
BD Speed of transport in downside whlle normal. 0.6 
BO Normal elevator operation (elevator running). 0.8 
Bl Explosion vents not in use. 0.98 
B2 Explosion vents undersized. 1.0 x w-6 
B3 Vent cover has too high of yield strength. 1.0 x w-6 
B4 Explosion suppression not in use. 0.99 
B5 Confinement in boot while normal. 0.9999 
B6 Oxygen in boot while normal. 1.0 
B7 Confinement in boot while maintenance. 0.998 
B8 Oxygen in boot while maintenance, 1.0 
B9 Confinement in head while normal 0.999 
BlO Oxygen in head while normal. 1.0 
Ell Confinement in head while maintenance. 0.998 
B12 Oxygen in head while maintenance. 1.0 
B13 Confinement in upside while normal. 0.999 
B14 Oxygen in upside while normal. 1.0 
B15 Confinement in upside while maintenance. 0.998 
B16 Oxygen in upside while maintenance. 1.0 
B17 Confinement in downside while normal. 0.999 
B18 Oxygen in downside while normal. 1.0 
B19 Confinement in downside while maintenance. 0.998 
B20 Oxygen in downside while maintenance. 1.0 
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B21 Explosion vents blocked. 1.0 X 10·4 
B22 Explosion vents sealed shut. 1.0 X 10·4 
B23 Type of grain being transported in boot while normal. 0.6 
B24 Grade of grain in boot while norm~. 0.6 
B25 Aspiration system in boot while n<)rmal. 0.6 
B26 Other dust abatement activities not available in boot while normal. 0.99 
B27 Failure of dust abatement activities in boot while normal. 0.4 
B28 Maintenance activities in boot. 0.08 
B29 Dust not allowed to clear before maintenance begins in boot. 1.0 x 1o·8 
B30 Dust cloud formed by disturbed giiain/ dust pile in boot while 1.0 X 10·8 
maintenance. 
B31 Type of grain being transported in head while normal. 0.6 
B32 Grade of grain being transported fu head while normal. 0.6 
B33 Aspiration system being used in head while normal. 0.6 
B34 Other dust abatement activities not available in head while normal. 0.99 
B35 Failure of dust abatement activities in head while normal. 0.4 
B36 Maintenance activities in head. 0.04 
B37 Dust not allowed to clear before maintenance begins in head. 1.0 X 10·8 
B38 Dust cloud formed by disturbed grtainjdust pile in head while 1.0 x w-8 
maintenance. 
B39 Type of grain being transported in upside while normal. 0.6 
B40 Grade of grain being transported in upside while normal. 0.6 
B41 Aspiration system being used in upside while normal. 0.6 
B42 Other dust abatement activities not available in upside while normal. 0.99 
B43 Failure of dust abatement activiti¢s in upside while normal. 0.4 
B44 Maintenance activities in upside. 0.04 
B45 Dust not allowed to clear before D)laintenance begins in upside. 1.0 X 10·8 
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B46 Dust cloud formed by disturbed grain/dust pile in upside while 1.0 x 10-8 
maintenance. 
B47 Type of grain being transported in downside while normal. 0.6 
B48 Grade of grain being transported in downside while normal. 0.6 
B49 Aspiration system being used in downside while normal. 0.6 
B50 Other dust abatement activities not available in downside while normal. 0.99 
B51 Failure of dust abatement activities in downside while normal. 0.4 
B52 Maintenance activities in downside. 0.04 
B53 Dust not allowed to clear before maintenance begins in downside. 1.0 x 10-8 
B54 Dust cloud formed by disturbed grain/dust pile in downside while 1.0 x 10-8 
maintenance. 
B55 Pressure sensors fail. 1.27 x 10-1 
B56 Signal from pressure sensors is interrupted. 6.07 x 10-4 
B57 Canister valve fails. 1.0 x 10-5 
B58 Canister leaks down. 2.05 x 10-3 
B59 Improper system design. 1.0 x 10-4 
B60 Other processes leading to flames lin boot while normal. 1.0 x 10-8 
B61 Personnel causing flames in boot while normal. 1.0 x 10-8 
B62 Other processes leading to flames in head while normal. 1.0 x 10-8 
B63 Personnel causing flames in head While normal. 1.0 x 10-8 
B64 Overheating of motor drive leading to hot surfaces (non-bearing) 1.4 x 10-4 
in head while normal. 
B65 Personnel causing flames in upside while normal. 1.0 x 10-8 
B66 Personnel causing flames in downside while normal. 1.0 x 10-8 
B67 Canister leaks completely leading to canisters are empty. 2.05 x 10-4 
B68 Canisters not filled after use leadmg to canisters are empty. 1.0 x 10-6 
B69 Bearing wear out leading to overheated bearing in boot while 3.1 x 10-4 
normal. 
B70 Overheating of motors, fuses, switches leading to hot surfaces 1.4 x 10-4 
in head while normal. 
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B71 Other processes leading to flames in upside while normal. 1.0 X 10·8 
B72 Other processes leading to hot surfaces in upside while normal. 1.0 X 10·8 
B73 Bearing wear out leading to bearing failure leading to sparking 
in boot while normal. 
3.1 X 10·5 
B74 Belt-to-ground leading to discharge ofstatic electricity in boot while 1.0 X 10·9 
normal. 
B75 Dust-to-ground leading to discharge of static electricity in boot 1.0 X 10·9 
while normal. 
B76 Belt slippage ignored leading to overheating of shaft lagging in boot 1.0 X 10·3 
while normal. 
B77 Other processes leading to flames .in downside while normal. 1.0 X 10·8 
B78 Other processes leading to hot surfaces in downside while normal. 1.0 X 10·8 
B79 Welding/ cutting with torch leading to flames in boot while 1.0 X 10·3 
maintenance. 
B80 Personnel leading to flames in boot while maintenance. 1.0 X 10·8 
B81 Arc welding leading to electric sparks in boot while maintenance. 1.0 X 10·3 
B82 Slow down device unavailable in boot while normal. 0.7 
B83 Grinding leading to friction sparks in boot while maintenance. 1.0 X 10·3 
B84 Welded surfaces leading to hot surlfaces in boot while maintenance. 1.0 X 10·3 
B85 Cut surfaces leading to hot surfac~ in boot while maintenance. 1.0 X 10·3 
B86 Ground surfaces leading to hot surfaces in boot while maintenance. 1.0 x to-3 
B87 Bearing wear out leading to overheated bearing in head while 3.0 X 10·4 
normal. 
B88 Slow down device fails in head while normal 0.25 
B89 Misaligned belt in boot while normal. 1.0 x to-7 
B90 Personnel ignore misaligned belt llil boot while normal. 0.9 
B91 Bearing wear out leading to bear~g failure leading to sparking 3.o x to-5 
in head while normal. 
B92 Belt-to-ground leading to discharge of static electricity in head 1.0 X 10·9 
while normal. 
B93 Dust-to-ground leading to discharge of static electricity in head 
while normal. 
B94 Personnel ignore belt slippage in head while normal. 
B95 Belt tracking device unavailable in boot while normal. 
B96 Belt tracking device fails in boot while normal. 
B97 Welding/cutting with torch leading to flames in head while 
maintenance. 
B98 Personnel leading to flames in head while maintenance. 
B99 Arc welding leading to electric sparks in head while maintenance. 
B100 Misaligned belt in head while normal. 
B101 Grinding leading to friction sparks in head while maintenance. 
B102 Welded surfaces leading to hot surfaces in head while maintenance. 
B103 Cut surfaces leading to hot surface$ in head while maintenance. 
B 104 Ground surfaces leading to hot surfaces in head while maintenance. 
B 105 Other processes leading to electric 1sparks, leading to sparks in 
upside while normal. 
B 106 Misaligned belt leading to rubbing belt in upside while normal. 
B107 Deformed casing leading to rubbing belt in upside while normal. 
B108 Deformed bucket leading to rubbirtg bucket in upside while normal. 
B109 Personnel ignore misaligned belt m head while normal. 
BllO Belt tracking device unavailable in head while normal. 
B 111 Welding/ cutting with torch leadin8 to flames in upside while 
maintenance. 
B112 Personnel leading to flames in ups~oe while maintenance. 
B 113 Arc welding leading to electric sparks in upside while maintenance. 
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1.0 X 10-9 
0.2 
1.0 X 10-3 
0.5 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 X 10-7 
5.0 X 10-8 
0.2 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 x w-3 
B114 Auto-lubrication unit not available leading to sparking in boot while normal. 0.98 
B 115 Grinding leading to friction sparks in upside while maintenance. 
B116 Welded surfaces leading to hot surfaces in upside while 
maintenance. 
B 117 Cut surfaces leading to hot surfaces in upside while maintenance. 
1.0 x w-3 
1.0 x w-3 
1.0 X 10-3 
B118 Ground surfaces leading to hot surfaces in upside while 
maintenance. 
B119 Other processes leading to electric sparks, leading to sparks in 
downside while normal. 
B 120 Misaligned belt leading to rubbing belt in downside while normal. 
B 121 Deformed casing leading to rubbing belt in downside while normal. 
B 122 Deformed bucket leading to rubbing bucket in downside while 
normal. 
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1.0 x w-3 
l.Oxl0-7 
l.Oxl0-7 
1.0 x w-7 
5.o x w-8 
B123 Auto-lubrication unit not available1leading to overheated bearing in boot 0.98 
while normal. 
B 124 Heat sensitive tape not available in boot while normal. 0.99 
B125 Welding/cutting with torch leadinS to flames in downside while 
maintenance. 
B 126 Personnel leading to flames in downside while maintenance. 
B 127 Arc welding leading to electric sparks in downside while 
maintenance. 
B128 Heat sensitive paint not available i!n boot while normal. 
B129 Grinding leading to friction sparks in downside while maintenance. 
B130 Welded surfaces leading to hot surfaces in downside while 
maintenance. 
1.0 x w-3 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 X 10-3 
0.99 
1.0 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-3 
B 131 Cut surfaces leading to hot surfaces in downside while maintenance. 1.0 x 10-3 
B132 Ground surfaces leading to hot surfaces in downside while 1.0 x 10-3 
maintenance. 
B 133 Failure of auto-lubrication unit leading to loss of lubrication leading 2.8 x 10-3 
to bearing failure leading to overheating in boot while normal. 
B134 Heat sensors not available leading, to over heated bearing in boot while 0.99 
normal. 
B135 Failure of maintenance program l¢ading to loss of lubrication 3.25 x 10-4 
leading to bearing failure leading ~o overheating in boot while normal. 
B 136 Bearing sensors fail leading to hea!t sensors do not signal leading 
to overheated bearings in boot whUe normal. 
B137 Heat sensitive paint fails leading t(> heat sensitive paint does not 
signal in boot while normal. 
3.39 X 10-3 
1.0 X 10-3 
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B 138 Heat sensitive tape fails leading to heat sensitive tape does not 1.0 x 10·3 
signal in boot while normal. 
B139 Foreign material in grain stream leading to foreign material in boot 1.0 x 10·5 
while normal. 
B140 Foreign material not removed by grate leading to foreign material in boot 0.45 
while normal. 
B141 Foreign material not removed by magnets leading to foreign material in 0.9999 
boot while normal. 
B 142 "Large" foreign material in grain stream leading to "large" foreign 1.0 X 10·7 
material enters leg in boot while normal. 
B143 Grate does not remove leading to ;'large" foreign material enters leg 1.0 x 10·3 
in boot while normal. 
B144 Magnet does not remove leading to "large" foreign material enters leg in 0.99999 
boot while normal. 
B145 Failure of auto-lubrication unit lea¢iing to loss of lubrication leading 2.8 x w-4 
to bearing failure leading to sparkitilg in boot while normal. 
B146 Bearing sensors not available leading to overheated bearing in head while 0.99 
normal. 
B147 Failure of maintenance program le~ding to loss of lubrication 
leading to bearing failure leading ta sparking in boot while normal. 
B 148 Shorting of electric power supply h~ading to electric sparks in boot 
while normal. 
3.25 x w-5 
1.0 x w-7 
B149 Heat sensitive tape not available leading to overheated bearing in head 0.99 
while normal. 
B150 Heat sensitive paint not available leading to overheated bearing in head 0.99 
while normal. 
B151 Belt tracking device fails in head while normal. 0.5 
B152 Belt tracking device unavailable in upside while normal. 1.0 x 10·3 
B 153 Belt tracking device fails in upside while normal. 0.5 
B154 Personnel ignore misaligned belt in downside while normal. 0.9 
B155 Belt tracking device unavailable in downside while normal. 1.0 x w-3 
B 156 Belt tracking device fails in downside while normal. 0.5 
B157 Power tools in use leading to power tools leading to electric sparks in boot 0.1 
while maintenance. 
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B158 Auto-lubrication unit not available leading to overheated bearing in head 0.98 
while normal. 
B159 Failure of auto-lubrication unit leading to loss of lubrication leading 3.0 x 10-3 
to bearing failure leading to overheating in head while normal. 
B160 Auto-lubrication unit not available leading to sparking in head while 0.98 
normal. 
B 161 Failure of maintenance program leading to loss of lubrication 3.2 x 10-4 
leading to bearing failure leading to overheating in head while normal. 
B 162 Bearing sensors fail leading to heat sensors do not signal leading 3.39 x 10-3 
to overheated bearings in head while normal. 
B163 Heat sensitive paint fails leading to heat sensitive paint does not 1.0 x 10-3 
signal in head while normal. 
B164 Heat sensitive tape fails leading to heat sensitive tape does not 1.0 x 10-3 
signal in head while normal. 
B165 Foreign material in grain stream leading to foreign material in head 1.0 x 10-5 
while normal. 
B166 Foreign material not removed by grate leading to foreign material in head 0.45 
while normal. 
B167 Foreign material not removed by magnets leading to foreign material in 
head while normal. 
B168 "Large" foreign material in grain stream leading to "large" foreign 
material enters leg in head while normal. 
B169 Grate does not remove leading to ;'large" foreign material enters leg 
in head while normal. 
B 170 Magnet does not remove leading to "large" foreign material enters leg 
in head while normal. 
B 171 Failure of auto-lubrication unit leading to loss of lubrication leading 
to bearing failure leading to sparking in head while normal. 
B 172 Slack in belt leading to belt slippage in boot while normal. 
B 173 Failure of maintenance program leading to loss of lubrication 
leading to bearing failure leading ~o sparking in head while normal. 
B174 Shorting of electric power supply leading to electric sparks in head 
while normal. 
B 175 Slow down device fails leading to belt slippage in head while normal. 
B176 Slow down device not available in head while normal. 
0.9999 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 X 10-3 
0.99999 
3.0 X 10-3 
2.0 X 10-3 
3.2 X 10-5 
1.0 X 10-7 
0.25 
0.7 
B 177 Slack in belt leading to belt slippage in head while normal. 
B 178 Lagging fails leading to belt slippage in head while normal. 
B 179 Excessive load on belt leading to btdt slippage in head while normal. 
B 180 Personnel ignore misaligned belt in upside while normal. 
B183 Power tools in use leading to power tools leading to electric sparks 
in head while maintenance. 
B 185 Dust-to-ground leading to static electric discharge in upside while 
normal. 
B186 Belt-to-ground leading to static electric discharge in upside while 
normal. 
B 190 Power tools in use leading to power tools leading to electric sparks in 
upside while maintenance. 
B192 Dust-to-ground leading to static electric discharge in downside 
while normal. 
B193 Belt-to-ground leading to static electric discharge in downside while 
normal. 
B 197 Power tools in use leading to power tools leading to electric sparks 
in downside while maintenance. 
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5.0 X 10-4 
1.0 X 10-7 
1.0 X 10-4 
0.2 
0.1 
1.0 X 10-9 
1.0 X 10-8 
0.1 
1.0 X 10-9 
1.0 X 10-S 
0.1 
B199 Interlock fails leading to bearing sensor signal ignored in boot while 1.49 x 10-1 
normal. 
B200 Personnel ignore leading to bearing sensor signal ignored in boot while 0.01 
normal. 
B201 Personnel ignore leading to heat sensitive paint signal ignored in boot 
while normal. 
0.2 
B202 Personnel ignore leading to heat sensitive tape signal ignored in boot while 0.2 
normal. 
B205 Shorting of power tools leading to spark from power tool in boot 
while maintenance. 
7.0 X 10-4 
B206 Power tool does not have enclosed motor leading to spark from power 0.999 
tool in boot while maintenance. 
B209 Interlock fails leading to bearing sensor signal ignored in head 
while normal. 
B210 Personnel ignore leading to bearing sensor signal ignored in head 
while normal. 
1.49 X 10-1 
0.01 
B211 Personnel ignore leading to heat sensitive paint signal ignored in head 
while normal. 
B212 Personnel ignore leading to heat sensitive tape signal ignored in head 
while normal. 
B215 Shorting of power tools leading to spark from power tool in head 
while maintenance. 
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0.2 
0.2 
7.0 X 10·4 
B216 Power tool does not have enclosed motor leading to spark from power tool 0.999 
in head while maintenance. 
B219 Foreign material in grain stream leading to foreign material in 
upside while normal. 
B220 Foreign material not removed by gli"ate leading to foreign material in 
upside while normal. 
1.0 X 10·6 
0.45 
B221 Foreign material not removed by magnets leading to foreign material in 0.9999 
upside while normal. 
B222 "Large" foreign material in grain stream leading to "large" foreign 1.0 x 10·8 
material enters leg in upside while normal. 
B223 Grate does not remove leading to "large" foreign material enters 1.0 x 10·3 
leg in upside while normal. 
B224 Magnet does not remove leading to "large" foreign material enters leg in 0.99999 
upside while normal. 
B225 Shorting of power tools leading to spark from power tool in upside 
while maintenance. 
7.0 X 10-4 
B226 Power tool does not have enclosed motor leading to spark from power 0.999 
tool in upside while maintenance. 
B229 Foreign material in grain stream leading to foreign material in 
downside while normal. 
B230 Foreign material not removed by grate leading to foreign material in 
downside while normal. 
1.0 X 10·8 
0.45 
B231 Foreign material not removed by llilagnets leading to foreign material 0.9999 
in downside while normal. 
B232 "Large" foreign material in grain stteam leading to "large" foreign 1.0 x 10·9 
material enters leg in downside whUe normal. 
B233 Grate does not remove leading to 'Uarge" foreign material enters 1.0 x 10-3 
leg in downside while normal. 
B234 Magnet does not remove leading to "large" foreign material enters leg in 0.99999 
downside while normal. 
B235 Shorting of power tools leading to spark from power tool in 
downside while maintenance. 
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7.0 X 10·4 
B236 Power tool does not have enclosed motor leading to spark from power tool 0.999 
in downside while maintenance. 
B238 Auto-lubrication unit not available leading to seized bearing leading to 0.98 
belt slippage in boot while normal. 
B239 Dusty area leading to dust covers paint in boot while normal. 0.99 
B240 Inadequate housekeeping leading to dust covers paint in boot while normal. 0.85 
B241 Dusty area leading to dust covers tape in boot while normal. 0.99 
B242 Inadequate housekeeping leading to dust covers tape in boot while normal. 0.85 
B243 Dusty area leading to dust covers paint in head while normal. 0.95 
B244 Inadequate housekeeping leading to dust covers paint in head while normal. 0.8 
B245 Dusty area leading to dust covers tape in head while normal. 0.95 
B246 Inadequate housekeeping leading to dust covers tape in head while normal. 0.8 
B247 Bearing wear out leading to seized bearing leading to belt 3.0 x 10·5 
slippage in boot while normal. 
B248 Failure of auto-lubrication unit leading to seized bearing in boot 2.8 x 10·4 
while normal. 
B249 Failure of maintenance program l~ading to loss of lubrication 3.25 x 10·5 
leading to seized bearing leading t~ belt slippage in boot while normal. 
* point estimate of probability of occurrence per bucket elevator leg season 
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GATE 
ID GATE DESCRIPTION 
GO Secondary grain dust explosion in bucket elevator leg. 
G 1 Primary grain dust explosion in bucket elevator leg 
G2 Explosion vents fail. 
G3 Explosion suppression devices fail. 
G4 Failure in boot while normal. 
G5 Failure in boot while maintenance. 
G6 Failure in head while normal. 
G7 Failure in head while maintenance. 
G8 Failure in upside while normal. 
G9 Failure in upside while maintenance. 
G 10 Failure in downside while normal. 
G 11 Failure in downside while maintenance. 
G 12 Explosion vents not operative. 
G 13 Explosion suppression fails. 
G14 Ignition in boot while normal. 
G 15 Fuel in boot while normal. 
G 16 Ignition in boot while maintenance. 
G 17 Fuel in boot while maintenance. 
G 18 Ignition in head while normal. 
G 19 Fuel in head while normal. 
G20 Ignition in head while maintenance. 
G21 Fuel in head while maintenance, 
G22 Ignition in upside while normal. 
G23 Fuel in upside while normal. 
G24 Ignition in upside while maintenance. 
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G25 Fuel in upside while maintenance. 
G26 Ignition in downside while normal. 
G27 Fuel in downside while normal. 
G28 Ignition in downside while maintenance. 
G29 Fuel in downside while maintenance. 
G30 Pressure sensors do not signal. 
G31 Canisters fail to discharge. 
G32 Insufficient agent to extinguish flame front. 
G33 Overheated bearing in boot while normal. 
G34 Friction sparks in boot while normal. 
G35 Flames in boot while normal. 
G36 Electric sparks in boot while normal. 
GA Hot surfaces in boot while nomtal. 
G37 Explosion in elevator leg while l!lormal 
G38 Ignition from maintenance actiV!ities in boot. 
G39 Overheated bearing in head while normal. 
G40 Friction sparks in head while normal. 
G41 Flames in head while normal. 
G42 Electric sparks in head while notmal. 
GB Hot surfaces (Non-bearings) in head while normal. 
G43 Explosion in elevator while maintenance 
G44 Ignition from maintenance activities in head. 
G45 Sparks in upside while normal. 
G46 Flames in upside while normal. 
G47 Hot surfaces in upside while nortnal. 
G48 Ignition from maintenance activities in upside. 
G49 Sparks in downside while normal. 
G50 Flames in downside while normal. 
G51 
G52 
G53 
G54 
G55 
G56 
G57 
G58 
G59 
G60 
G61 
G62 
G63 
G64 
G65 
G66 
G67 
G68 
G69 
Hot surfaces in downside while normal. 
Ignition from maintenance activities in downside. 
Canisters are empty. 
Bearing failure leading to overheating in boot while normal. 
Heat sensors do not signal overheated bearing in boot while normal. 
Other dust abatement activities in boot while normal. 
Other dust abatement activities in head while normal. 
Bearing failure leading to sparking in boot while normal. 
Other dust abatement activities in upside while normal. 
Other dust abatement activities in downside while normal. 
Discharge of static electricity causing electric sparks in boot while normal. 
Primary explosion in elevator leg while normal 
Overheated shaft lagging in boot while normal. 
Belt slippage ignored leading to overheated shaft lagging in boot while 
normal. 
Flames from maintenance activities in boot while maintenance. 
Electric sparks from maintenance activities in boot while maintenance. 
Slow down device does not signal leading to belt slippage ignored in boot 
while normal. 
Hot surfaces from maintenance activities in boot while maintenance. 
Bearing failure leading to overheating in head while normal. 
G70 Heat sensors do not signal overheated bearing in head while normal. 
G71 Rubbing belt leading to hot surfaces in boot while normal. 
G72 Alignment not corrected leading to rubbing belt in boot while normal. 
G73 Bearing failure leading to sparking in head while normal. 
G74 Belt tracking device does not signal leading to rubbing belt in boot while 
normal. 
G75 Alignment not corrected leading to rubbing belt in head while normal. 
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G76 Discharge of static electricity causing electric sparks in head while normal. 
G77 Belt tracking device does not signal in head while normal. 
G78 Overheating of shaft lagging leading to hot surfaces (Non-bearings) in head 
while normal. 
G79 Rubbing belt leading to hot surfaces in head while normal. 
G80 Flames from maintenance activities in head while maintenance. 
G81 Electric sparks from maintenance activities in head while maintenance. 
G83 Hot surfaces from maintenance activities in head while maintenance. 
G84 Electric sparks leading to sparks in upside while normal. 
G85 Friction sparks leading to sparks in upside while normal. 
G86 Belt tracking device does not signal in upside while normal. 
G87 Rubbing belt leading to hot surfaces in upside while normal. 
G88 Misalignment not leading to rubbing belt in upside while normal. 
G89 Misalignment not corrected leading to rubbing belt in upside while normal. 
G90 Flames from maintenance activities in upside while maintenance. 
G91 Electric sparks from maintenance activities in upside while maintenance. 
G92 Rubbing belt leading to hot surfaces in downside while normal. 
G93 Hot surfaces from maintenance activities in upside while maintenance. 
G94 Electric sparks leading to sparks in downside while normal. 
G95 Friction sparks leading to sparks in downside while normal. 
G96 Misaligned belt not corrected leading to rubbing belt in downside while 
normal. 
G97 Hot surfaces in downside while normal. 
G98 Belt tracking device does not signal in downside while normal. 
G99 Belt slippage leading to overheated shaft lagging in boot while normal. 
G 100 Flames from maintenance activities in downside while maintenance. 
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G 101 Electric sparks from maintenance activities in downside while maintenance. 
G103 Hot surfaces from maintenance activities in downside while maintenance. 
G 104 Loss of lubrication leading to bearing overheating in boot while normal. 
G 105 Bearing sensors do not signal leading to overheated bearing in boot while 
normal. 
G106 Heat sensitive paint does not signal leading to overheated bearing in boot 
while normal. 
G 107 Heat sensitive tape does not signal leading to overheated bearing in boot 
while normal. 
G 108 Foreign material in boot leading to friction sparks in boot while normal. 
G 109 "Lar~e" foreign material enters leg leading to dislodged bucket leading to 
friction sparks in boot while normal. 
G 110 Loss of lubrication leading to bearing failure leading to sparking in boot 
while normal. 
G 111 Auto-lubrication fails in boot while normal. 
G 115 Power tools leading to electric sparks in boot while maintenance. 
G 117 Loss of lubrication leading to bearing overheating in head while normal. 
G 118 Bearing sensors do not signal leading to overheated bearing in head while 
normal. 
G 119 Heat sensitive paint does not signal leading to overheated bearing in head 
while normal. 
G 120 Heat sensitive tape does not signal leading to overheated bearing in head 
while normal. 
G 121 Foreign material in head leading to lodged foreign material leading to 
friction sparks in head while normal. 
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G 122 "Large" foreign material enters leg leading to dislodged bucket in head while 
normal. 
G 123 Loss of lubrication leading to bearing failure leading to sparking in head 
while normal. 
G 126 Belt slippage leading to overheated shaft lagging in head while normal. 
G 127 Belt slippage ignored leading to overheated shaft lagging in head while 
normal. 
G 128 Power tools leading to electric sparks in head while maintenance. 
G 129 Auto-lubrication unit fails leading to bearing failure leading to sparking in 
head while normal. 
G 130 Static electric discharge leading to electric sparks in upside while normal. 
G131 Auto-lubrication unit fails leading to sparking in boot while normal. 
G 132 Auto-lubrication unit fails leading to loss of lubrication leading to over 
heated bearing in head while normal. 
G 133 Power tools leading to electric sparks in upside while maintenance. 
G 134 Auto-lubrication unit fails leading to seized bearing leading to belt slippage 
in boot while normal. 
G 135 Static electric discharge leading to electric sparks in downside while normal. 
G 136 Bearing sensors fail leading to overheated bearing in boot while normal. 
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G 137 Heat sensitive tape fails leading to over heated bearing in boot while normal. 
G 138 Power tools leading to electric sparks in downside while maintenance. 
G 139 Heat sensitive paint fails leading to over heated bearing in boot while 
normal. 
G 140 Bearing sensors signal i~ored leading to heat sensors do not signal leading 
to overheated bearings m boot while normal. 
G141 Heat sensitive paint ignored leading to heat sensitive paint does not signal in 
boot while normal. 
G 142 Heat sensitive tape ignored leading to heat sensitive tape does not signal in 
boot while normal. 
G143 Bearing sensors fail leading to over heated bearing in head while normal. 
G144 Spark from power tool leading to power tool leading to electric sparks in 
boot while maintenance. 
G145 Seized bearing leading to belt slippage in boot while normal. 
G146 Bearing sensors signal i~nored leading to heat sensors do not signal leading 
to overheated bearings m head while normal. 
G147 Heat sensitive paint ignored leading to heat sensitive paint does not signal in 
head while normal. 
G148 Heat sensitive tape ignored leading to heat sensitive tape does not signal in 
head while normal. 
G 149 Heat sensitive tape ignored leading to heat sensitive paint does not signal in 
head while normal. 
G 150 Spark from power tool leading to power tool leading to electric sparks in 
head while maintenance. 
G151 Slow down device does not signal leading to belt slippage in head while 
normal. 
G152 Foreign material leading to lodged foreign material in upside while 
normal. 
G 153 "Large" foreign material enters leg leading to friction sparks in upside while 
normal. 
G 154 Spark from power tool leading to power tool leading to electric sparks in 
upside while maintenance. 
G 155 Loss of lubrication leading to seized bearing in boot while normal. 
G156 Foreign material leading to lodged foreign material in downside while 
normal. 
G 157 "Large" foreign material enters leg leading to friction sparks in downside 
while normal. 
G 158 Spark from power tool leading to power tool leading to electric sparks in 
downside while maintenance. 
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G 159 Heat sensitive paint ignored leading to heat sensitive paint does not signal in 
head while normal. 
G 160 Dust covers paint leading to signal ignored in boot while normal. 
G 161 Dust covers tape leading to signal ignored in boot while normal. 
G 162 Dust covers paint leading to signal ignored in head while normal. 
G 163 Dust covers tape leading to signal ignored in head while normal. 
APPENDIXE 
INPUTTOWAM-EPROGRAM 
105 
106 
WAMCUTDATAINFILE'U13212AWAMCUT.DATA' 
N 2 l.OE-08 3 
GO AND 3 0 G1 G2 G3 
G1 OR 2 0 G37 G43 
G2 OR 1 3 G12 B1 B2 B3 
G3 OR 1 1 G13 B4 
G4 AND 2 2 G14 G15 B5 B6 
G5 AND 2 2 G16 G17 B7 B8 
G6 AND 2 2 G18 G19 B9 B10 
G7 AND 2 2 G20 G21 Bll B12 
G8 AND 2 2 G22 G23 B13 B14 
G9 AND 2 2 G24 G25 B15 B16 
G10 AND 2 2 G26 G27 B17 B18 
Gll AND 2 2 G28 G29 B19 B20 
G12 OR 0 2 B21 B22 
G13 OR 3 0 G30 G31 G32 
G14 OR 5 0 G33 G34 G35 G36 GA 
G15 AND 1 4 G56 B23 B24 B25 BA 
G16 AND 1 1 G38 B28 
G17 OR 0 2 B29 B30 
G18 OR 5 0 G39 G40 G41 G42 GB 
G19 AND 1 4 G57 B31 B32 B33 BB 
G20 AND 1 1 G44 B36 
G21 OR 0 2 B37 B38 
G22 OR 3 0 G45 G46 G47 
G23 AND 1 4 G59 B39 B40 B41 BC 
G24 AND 1 1 G48 B44 
G25 OR 0 2 B45 B46 
G26 OR 3 0 G49 G50 G51 
G27 AND 1 4 G60 B47 B48 B49 BD 
G28 AND 1 1 G52 B52 
G29 OR 0 2 B53 B54 
G30 OR 0 2 B55 B56 
G31 OR 1 1 G53 B57 
G32 OR 0 2 B58 B59 
G33 AND 2 0 G54 G55 
G34 OR 3 0 G108 G109 G58 
G35 OR 0 2 B60 B61 
G36 OR 1 1 G61 B148 
GA OR 2 0 G63 G71 
G37 AND 1 1 G62 BO 
G38 OR 3 1 G65 G66 G68 B83 
G39 AND 2 0 G69 G70 
G40 OR 3 0 G121 G122 G73 
G41 OR 0 2 B62 B63 
G42 OR 1 1 G76 B174 
GB OR 2 2 G78 G79 B70 B64 
G43 OR 4 0 G5 G7 G9 Gll 
G44 OR 3 1 G80 G81 G83 B101 
G45 OR 2 0 G84 G85 
G46 OR 0 2 B65 B71 
G47 OR 1 1 G87 B72 
G48 OR 3 1 G90 G91 G93 B115 
G49 OR 2 0 G94 G95 
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G50 OR 0 2 B66 B77 
G51 OR 1 1 G97 B78 
G52 OR 3 1 G100 G101 G103 B129 
G53 OR 0 2 B67 B68 
G54 OR 1 1 G104 B69 
G55 AND 3 0 G105 G106 G107 
G56 OR 0 2 B26 B27 
G57 OR 0 2 B34 B35 
G58 OR 1 1 GllO B73 
G59 OR 0 2 B42 B43 
G60 OR 0 2 B50 B51 
G61 OR 0 2 B74 B75 
G62 OR 4 0 G4 G6 G8 G10 
G63 AND 2 0 G99 G64 
G64 AND 1 1 G67 B76 
G65 OR 0 2 B79 B80 
G66 OR 1 1 G115 B81 
G67 OR 0 2 B82 B88 
G68 OR 0 3 B84 B85 B86 
G69 OR 1 1 G117 B87 
G70 AND 3 0 G118 G119 G120 
G71 AND 1 1 G72 B89 
G72 AND 1 1 G74 B90 
G73 OR 1 1 G123 B91 
G74 OR 0 2 B95 B96 
G75 AND 1 1 G77 B109 
G76 OR 0 2 B92 B93 
G77 OR 0 2 BllO B151 
G78 AND 2 0 G126 G127 
G79 AND 1 1 G75 B100 
G80 OR 0 2 B97 B98 
G81 OR 1 1 G128 B99 
G83 OR 0 3 B102 B103 B104 
G84 OR 1 1 G130 B105 
G85 OR 2 0 G152 G153 
G86 OR 0 2 B152 B153 
G87 OR 1 2 G88 B107 B108 
G88 AND 1 1 G89 B106 
G89 AND 1 1 G86 B180 
G90 OR 0 2 B111 B112 
G91 OR 1 1 G133 B113 
G92 AND 1 1 G96 B120 
G93 OR 0 3 Bl16 B117 B118 
G94 OR 1 1 G135 B119 
G95 OR 2 0 G156 G157 
G96 AND 1 1 G98 B154 
G97 OR 1 2 G92 B121 B122 
G98 OR 0 2 B155 B156 
G99 OR 1 1 G145 B172 
G100 OR 0 2 B125 B126 
G101 OR 1 1 G138 B127 
G103 OR 0 3 B130 B131 B132 
G104 AND 1 1 G111 B135 
GlOS OR 2 0 G136 G140 
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G106 OR 2 0 G137 G141 
G107 OR 2 0 G139 G142 
G108 AND 0 3 B139 B140 B141 
G109 AND 0 3 B142 B143 B144 
GllO AND 1 1 G131 B147 
G111 OR 0 2 B123 B133 
G115 AND 1 1 G144 B157 
G117 AND 1 1 G132 B161 
G118 OR 2 0 G143 G146 
G119 OR 2 0 G147 G149 
G120 OR 2 0 G148 G159 
G121 AND 0 3 B165 B166 B167 
G122 AND 0 3 B168 B169 B170 
G123 AND 1 1 G129 B173 
G126 OR 0 3 B177 B178 B179 
G127 AND 1 1 G151 B94 
G128 AND 1 1 G150 B183 
G129 OR 0 2 B160 B171 
G130 OR 0 2 B185 B186 
G131 OR 0 2 B114 B145 
G132 OR 0 2 B158 B159 
G133 AND 1 1 G154 B190 
G134 OR 0 2 B238 B248 
G135 OR 0 2 B192 B193 
G136 OR 0 2 B134 B136 
G137 OR 0 2 B128 B137 
G138 AND 1 1 G158 B197 
G139 OR 0 2 B124 B138 
G140 AND 0 2 B199 B200 
G141 OR 1 1 G160 B201 
G142 OR 1 1 G161 B202 
G143 OR 0 2 B146 B162 
G144 OR 0 2 B205 B206 
G145 OR 1 1 G155 B247 
G146 AND 0 2 B209 B210 
G147 OR 1 1 G162 B211 
G148 OR 1 1 G163 B212 
G149 OR 0 2 B149 B163 
G150 OR 0 2 B215 B216 
G151 OR 0 2 B175 B176 
G152 AND 0 3 B219 B220 B221 
G153 AND 0 3 B222 B223 B224 
G154 OR 0 2 B225 B226 
G155 AND 1 1 G134 B249 
G156 AND 0 3 B229 B230 B231 
G157 AND 0 3 B232 B233 B234 
G158 OR 0 2 B235 B236 
G159 OR 0 2 B150 B164 
G160 AND 0 2 B239 B240 
G161 AND 0 2 B241 B242 
G162 AND 0 2 B243 B244 
G163 AND 0 2 B245 B246 
END 
G162 G163 
BO 
Bl 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
B6 
B7 
B8 
B9 
BlO 
Bll 
B12 
B13 
B14 
B15 
B16 
B17 
B18 
B19 
B20 
B21 
B22 
B23 
B24 
B25 
BA 
B26 
B27 
B28 
B29 
B30 
B31 
B32 
B33 
BB 
B34 
B35 
B36 
B37 
B38 
B39 
B40 
B41 
BC 
B42 
B43 
B44 
B45 
B46 
B47 
B48 
B49 
BD 
8.0000E-01 
9.8000E-01 
l.OOOOE-06 
l.OOOOE-06 
9.9000E-Ol 
9.9900E-01 
l.OOOOE-00 
9.9800E-Ol 
l.OOOOE-00 
9.9900E-Ol 
l.OOOOE-00 
9.9800E-Ol 
l.OOOOE-00 
9.9900E-01 
l.OOOOE-00 
9.9800E-Ol 
l.OOOOE-00 
9.9900E-01 
l.OOOOE-00 
9.9800E-Ol 
l.OOOOE-00 
l.OOOOE-04 
l.OOOOE-04 
6.0000E-Ol 
6.0000E-Ol 
6.0000E-Ol 
6.0000E-Ol 
9.9000E-01 
4.0000E-01 
8.0000E-02 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
6.0000E-Ol 
6.0000E-01 
6.0000E-01 
6.0000E-01 
9.9000E-Ol 
4.0000E-01 
4.0000E-02 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
6.0000E-Ol 
6.0000E-Ol 
6.0000E-01 
6.0000E-01 
9.9000E-01 
4.0000E-01 
4.0000E-02 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
6.0000E-01 
6.0000E-01 
6.0000E-01 
6.0000E-01 
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B50 
B51 
B52 
B53 
B54 
B55 
B56 
B57 
B58 
B59 
B60 
B61 
B62 
B63 
B64 
B65 
B66 
B67 
B68 
B69 
B70 
B71 
B72 
B73 
B74 
B75 
B76 
B77 
B78 
B79 
B80 
B81 
B82 
B83 
B84 
B85 
B86 
B87 
B88 
B89 
B90 
B91 
B92 
B93 
B94 
B95 
B96 
B97 
B98 
B99 
BlOO 
BlOl 
B102 
B103 
9.9000E-Ol 
4.0000E-01 
4.0000E-02 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
1.2700E-01 
6.0700E-04 
l.OOOOE-05 
2.0500E-03 
l.OOOOE-04 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
1.4000E-04 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
2.0500E-04 
l.OOOOE-06 
3.1000E-04 
1.4000E-04 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
3.1000E-05 
l.OOOOE-09 
l.OOOOE-09 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-03 
7.0000E-Ol 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
3.0000E-04 
2.5000E-01 
l.OOOOE-07 
9.0000E-01 
3.0000E-05 
l.OOOOE-09 
l.OOOOE-09 
2.0000E-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
S.OOOOE-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
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B104 
B105 
B106 
B107 
BlOB 
B109 
BllO 
B111 
B112 
B113 
B114 
B115 
B116 
B117 
B118 
B119 
B120 
B121 
B122 
B123 
B124 
B125 
B126 
B127 
B128 
B129 
B130 
B131 
B132 
B133 
B134 
B135 
B136 
B137 
B138 
B139 
B140 
B141 
B142 
B143 
B144 
B145 
B146 
B147 
B148 
B149 
B150 
B151 
B152 
B153 
B154 
B155 
B156 
B157 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-07 
5.0000£-08 
2.0000£-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-03 
9.8000£-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-07 
5.0000£-08 
9.8000£-01 
9.9000£-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-03 
9.9000£-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
2.8000£-03 
9.9000£-01 
3.2500£-04 
3.3900£-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-05 
4.5000£-01 
9.9990£-01 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-03 
9.9999£-01 
2.8000£-04 
9.9000£-01 
3.2500£-05 
l.OOOOE-07 
9.9000£-01 
9.9000£-01 
5.0000£-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
5.0000£-01 
2.0000£-01 
l.OOOOE-03 
5.0000£-01 
l.OOOOE-01 
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B158 
B159 
B160 
B161 
B162 
B163 
B164 
B165 
B166 
B167 
B168 
B169 
B170 
B171 
B172 
B173 
B174 
B175 
B176 
B177 
B178 
B179 
B180 
B183 
B185 
B186 
B190 
B192 
B193 
B197 
B199 
B200 
B201 
B202 
B205 
B206 
B209 
B210 
B211 
B212 
B215 
B216 
B219 
B220 
B221 
B222 
B223 
B224 
B225 
B226 
B229 
B230 
B231 
B232 
9.8000E-01 
3.0000E-03 
9.8000E-01 
3.2000E-04 
3.3900E-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-03 
l.OOOOE-05 
4.5000E-01 
9.9990E-01 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-03 
9.9999E-01 
3.0000E-03 
2.0000E-03 
3.2000E-05 
l.OOOOE-07 
2.5000E-01 
6.0000E-01 
S.OOOOE-04 
l.OOOOE-07 
l.OOOOE-04 
2.0000E-01 
l.OOOOE-01 
l.OOOOE-09 
1.0000E-08 
l.OOOOE-01 
l.OOOOE-09 
l.OOOOE-08 
1.0000E-01 
1.4900E-01 
l.OOOOE-02 
2.0000E-01 
2.0000E-01 
7.0000E-04 
9.9900E-01 
1.4900E-01 
l.OOOOE-02 
2.0000E-01 
2.0000E-01 
7.0000E-04 
9.9900E-01 
l.OOOOE-06 
4.5000E-01 
9.9990E-01 
l.OOOOE-08 
l.OOOOE-03 
9.9999E-01 
7.0000E-04 
9.9900E-01 
l.OOOOE-08 
4.5000E-01 
9.9990E-01 
l.OOOOE-09 
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B233 
B234 
B235 
B236 
B238 
B239 
B240 
B241 
B242 
B243 
B244 
B245 
B246 
B247 
B248 
B249 
END 
END 
STOP 
l.OOOOE-03 
9.9999E-Ol 
7.0000E-04 
9.9000E-Ol 
9.8000E-01 
9.9000E-Ol 
8.5000E-01 
9.9000E-01 
8.5000E-Ol 
9.5000E-01 
8.0000E-01 
9.5000E-01 
8.0000E-01 
3.0000E-05 
2.8000E-04 
3.2500E-05 
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APPENDIXF 
MINIMUM CUT SETS OF FAULT TREE 
114 
115 
MINIMUM CUT SETS FOR GATE GO ORDERED BY PROBABILITY 
1. 3.07E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B128 B134 B135 
2. 3.03E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B149 B150 B158 B161 
3. 2.99E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B128 B134 
4. 2.90E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B149 B150 
5. 2.61E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
6. 2.61E-05 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B123 B128 B134 B135 B241 B242 
7. 2.54E-05 BO B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B69 B128 B134 B241 B242 
8. 2.54E-05 BO B1 B4 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B69 B124 B134 B239 B240 
9. 2.32E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B150 B158 B161 B243 B244 
10. 2.32E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B149 B158 B161 B245 B246 
11. 2.22E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B149 B245 B246 
12. 2.22E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B150 B243 B244 
13. 2.22E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
14. 2.16E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B134 B239 B240 B241 B242 
15. 1.78E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B158 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
16. 1.71E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B243 B244 B245 B246 
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17. 1.39E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B64 
18. 1.39E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B70 
19. 1.24E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 B128 B134 B135 
20. 1.22E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B149 B150 B158 B161 
21. 1.21E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B124 B128 B134 
22. 1.17E-05 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B149 B150 
23. 1.06£-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
24. 1.03E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B128 B134 B241 B242 
25. 1.03E-05 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B124 B134 B239 B240 
26. 9.39£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B149 B158 B161 B245 B246 
27. 9.39E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B150 B158 B161 B243 B244 
28. 8.98E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B149 B245 B246 
29. 8.98E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B150 B243 B244 
30. 8.97E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
31. 8.74E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B134 B239 B240 B241 B242 
32. 7.21£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B158 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
33. 6.90E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B243 B244 B245 B246 
117 
34. 6.21E-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B134 B135 B201 
35. 6.21£-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B128 B134 B135 B202 
36. 6.12E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B149 B158 B161 B212 
37. 6.12E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B150 B158 B161 B211 
38. 6.05£-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B134 B201 
39. 6.05£-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B128 B134 B202 
40. 5.97E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B94 B176 B177 
41. 5.85£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B150 B211 
42. 5.85£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B149 B212 
43. 5.63£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B64 
44. 5.63£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B70 
45. 5.28£-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B134 B135 B202 B239 B240 
46. 5.28£-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 I 
BA B26 B123 B134 B135 B201 B241 B242 I 
47. 5.14E-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B134 B202 B239 B240 
48. 5.14£-06 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B134 B201 B241 B242 
49. 4.69£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B158 B161 B211 B245 B246 
50. 4.69£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B158 B161 B212 B243 B244 
51. 4.49£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B212 B243 B244 
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52. 4.49E-06 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B211 B245 B246 
53. 3.94E-06 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B124 B128 B134 B135 
54. 3.88E-06 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B149 B150 B158 B161 
55. 3.84E-06 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B124 B128 B134 
56. 3.71E-06 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B149 B150 
57. 3.35E-06 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
58. 3.35E-06 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B128 B134 B135 B241 B242 
59. 3.26E-06 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B124 B134 B239 B240 
60. 3.26E-06 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B128 B134 B241 B242 
61. 3.17E-06 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 Bl14 B147 
62. 3.12E-06 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B160 B173 
63. 3.08E-06 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B73 
64. 2.98E-06 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B150 B158 Bl61 B243 B244 
65. 2.98E-06 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B91 
66. 2.98E-06 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B149 B158 B161 B245 B246 
67. 2.85E-06 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B149 B245 B246 
68. 2.85E-06 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
69. 2.85E-06 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B150 B243 B244 
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70. 2.77E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B134 B239 B240 B241 B242 
71. 2.51E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B128 B134 B135 B202 
72. 2.51E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 B134 B135 B201 
73. 2.49E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B94 B175 B177 
74. 2.47E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B150 B158 B161 B211 
75. 2.47E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B149 B158 B161 B212 
76. 2.44E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B691 B128 B134 B202 
77. 2.44£-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B124 B134 B201 
78. 2.41£-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B94 B176 B177 
79. 2.36E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B150 B211 
80. 2.36E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B149 B212 
81. 2.29£-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B158 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
82. 2.19£-06 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B243 B244 B245 B246 
83. 2.13£-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B134 B135 B201 B241 B242 
84. 2.13£-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B134 B135 B202 B239 B240 
85. 2.08£-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B691 B134 B201 B241 B242 
86. 2.08£-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B691 B134 B202 B239 B240 
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87. 1.90E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B158 B161 B211 B245 B246 
88. 1.90E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B158 B161 B212 B243 B244 
89. 1.81E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B211 B245 B246 
90. 1.81E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B212 B243 B244 
91. 1.79E-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B70 
92. 1.79E-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B64 
93. 1.59E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B124 B128 B134 B135 
94. 1.57E-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B149 B150 B158 B161 
95. 1.55E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B124 B128 B134 
96. 1.35E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B128 B134 B135 B241 B242 
97. 1.35E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
98. 1.32E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B124 B134 B239 B240 
99. 1.32E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B128 B134 B241 B242 
100. 1.30E-06 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B149 B150 
101. 1.28E-06 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B114 B147 
102. 1.26E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B160 B173 
103. 1.25E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B134 B135 B201 B202 
104. 1.25E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B73 
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105. 1.24E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B158 B161 B211 B212 
106. 1.22E-06 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B134 B201 B202 
107. 1.21E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B91 
108. 1.20E-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B150 B158 B161 B243 B244 
109. 1.20E-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B149 B158 B161 B245 B246 
110. 1.19E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B94 B176 B179 
111. 1.18E-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B211 B212 
112. 1.15E-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B149 B245 B246 
113. 1.15E-06 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B150 B243 B244 
114. 1.15E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
115. 1.12E-06 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B134 B239 B240 B241 B242 
116. l.OOE-06 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B94 B175 B177 
117. 9.25E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B158 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
118. 8.85E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B243 B244 B245 B246 
119. 7.97E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B124 B134 B135 B201 
120. 7.97E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B128 B134 B135 B202 
121. 7.85E-07 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B1~6 B149 B158 B161 B212 
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122. 7 .85E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B150 B158 B161 B211 
123. 7.76E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B124 B134 B201 
124. 7.76E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B128 B134 B202 
125. 7.66E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B94 B176 B177 
126. 7.50E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B149 B212 
127. 7 .SOE-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B150 B211 
128. 7 .22E-07 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B64 
• 129. 7.22E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B70 
130. 6. 77E-07 BO B1 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B134 B135 B202 B239 B240 
131. 6.77E-07 BO B1 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B12$ B134 B135 B201 B241 B242 
132. 6.59E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B134 B202 B239 B240 
133. 6.59E-07 BO B1 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B134 B201 B241 B242 
134. 6.02E-07 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B158 B161 B212 B243 B244 
135. 6.02E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B158 B161 B211 B245 B246 
136. 5.76E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B212 B243 B244 
137. 5.76E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B211 B245 B246 
138. 5.07E-07 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B12$ B134 B135 B201 B202 
139. 4.99E-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B158 B161 B211 B212 
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140. 4.97E-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B94 B175 B179 
141. 4.93E-07 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B134 B201 B202 
142. 4.82E-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B94 B176 B179 
143. 4.78E-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B211 B212 
144. 4.48£-07 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B139 B140 B141 
145. 4.48£-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B165 B166 B167 
146. 4.06£-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 Bl14 B147 
147. 4.00E-07 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B16C> B173 
148. 3.96£-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B73 
149. 3.83E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B91 
150. 3.22E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B128 B134 B135 B202 
151. 3.22E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B12$ B124 B134 B135 B201 
152. 3.19£-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B94 B175 B177 
153. 3.17E-07 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B150 B158 B161 B211 
154. 3.17E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B149 B158 B161 B212 
155. 3.13£-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B124 B134 B201 
156. 3.13E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B128 B134 B202 
157. 3.09E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B94 B176 B177 
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158. 3.03E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B150 B211 
159. 3.03E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B149 B212 
160. 2.74E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B134 B135 B202 B239 B240 
161. 2.74E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B134 B135 B201 B241 B242 
162. 2.66E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B134 B201 B241 B242 
163. 2.66E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B134 B202 B239 B240 
164. 2.43E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B158 B161 B212 B243 B244 
165. 2.43E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B146 B158 B161 B211 B245 B246 
166. 2.33E-07 BO B1 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B212 B243 B244 
167. 2.33E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B211 B245 B246 
168. 2.01E-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B94 B175 B179 
169. 1.81E-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B165 B166 B167 
170. 1.81E-07 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B139 B140 B141 
171. 1.64E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B114 B147 
172. 1.62E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B160 B173 
173. 1.61E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B134 B135 B201 B202 
174. 1.60E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B73 
175. 1.58E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B158 B161 B211 B212 
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176. 1.57E-07 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B134 B201 B202 
177. 1.55E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B91 
178. 1.53E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B94 B176 B179 
179. 1.52E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B146 B211 B212 
180. 1.39E-07 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B76 B82 B172 
181. 1.29E-07 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B94 B175 B177 
182. 1.05E-07 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B128 B135 B136 
183. 1.04E-07 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B149 B150 B158 B161 B162 
184. 1.02E-07 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B128 B136 
185. 9.92E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B149 B150 B162 
186. 9.27E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B149 B150 B159 B161 
187. 8.95E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B128 B135 B136 B241 B242 
188. 8.95E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B135 B136 B239 B240 
189. 8.78E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B124 B128 B133 B134 B135 
190. 8.71E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B128 B136 B241 B242 
191. 8.71E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B136 B239 B240 
192. 7.96E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B149 B158 B161 B162 B245 B246 
193. 7.96E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B1SO B158 B161 B162 B243 B244 
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194. 7.61E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B149 B162 B245 B246 
195. 7.61E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B150 B162 B243 B244 
196. 7.61E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B135 B136 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
197. 7.47E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B124 B133 B134 B135 B239 B240 
198. 7.47E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B128 B133 B134 B135 B241 B242 
199. 7.40E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B136 B239 B240 B241 B242 
200. 7.11E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B150 B159 B161 B243 B244 
201. 7.11E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B149 B159 B161 B245 B246 
202. 6.50E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B123 B134 B135 B201 B202 
203. 6.40E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B14:6 B158 B161 B211 B212 
204. 6.38E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B94 B175 B179 
205. 6.37E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B123 B124 B128 B134 B135 
206. 6.35E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B133 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
207. 6.33E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B69 B134 B201 B202 
208. 6.27E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B146 B149 B150 B158 B161 
209. 6.20E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B691 B124 B128 B134 
210. 6.19E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B94 B176 B179 
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211. 6.13E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B87 B146 B211 B212 
212. 6.11E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B158 B161 B162 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
213. 6.00E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B87 B146 B149 B150 
214. 5.84E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B162 B243 B244 B245 B246 
215. 5.74E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B165 B166 B167 
216. 5.74E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B139 B140 B141 
217. 5.63E-08 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B76 B82 B172 
218. 5.46E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B159 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
219. 5.41E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
220. 5 .41E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B123 B128 B134 B135 B241 B242 
221. 5.27E-08 BO B1 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B69 B128 B134 B241 B242 
222. 5.27E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B69' B124 B134 B239 B240 
223. 4.97E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B76 B88 B172 
224. 4.81E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B146 B149 B158 B161 B245 B246 
225. 4.81E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B146 B150 B158 B161 B243 B244 
226. 4.63E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B128 B135 B199 B200 
227. 4.60E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B123 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 B242 
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228. 4.60E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B87 B146 B149 B245 B246 
229. 4.60E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B87 B146 B150 B243 B244 
230. 4.56E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B149 B150 B158 B161 B209 B210 
231. 4.50E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B128 B199 B200 
232. 4.48E-08 BO Bl B4 B13 B14 B39 B40 B41 
BC B42 B219 B220 B221 
233. 4.48E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B691 B134 B239 B240 B241 B242 
234. 4.36E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B149 B150 B209 B210 
235. 4.25E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 B128 B135 B136 
236. 4.19E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B149 B150 B158 B161 B162 
237. 4.14E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69' B124 B128 B136 
238. 4.01E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B149 B150 B162 
239. 3.93E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B128 B135 B199 B200 B241 
B242 
240. 3.93E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B135 B199 B200 B239 
B240 
241. 3.83E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B199 B200 B239 B240 
242. 3.83E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69' B128 B199 B200 B241 B242 
243. 3.74E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B149 B150 B159 B161 
244. 3.69E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B146 B158 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
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245. 3.62E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 B135 B136 B239 B240 
246. 3.62E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B128 B135 B136 B241 B242 
247. 3.55E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B124 B128 Bl33 B134 B135 
248. 3.53E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B58 B87 B146 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
249. 3.52E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B128 Bl36 B241 B242 
250. 3.52E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B124 Bl36 B239 B240 
251. 3.50E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B149 B158 B161 B209 B210 B245 
B246 
252. 3.50E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 BlSO B158 B161 B209 B210 B243 
B244 
253. 3.35E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B149 B209 B210 B245 B246 
254. 3.35E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B150 B209 B210 B243 B244 
255. 3.34E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B135 Bl99 B200 B239 B240 
B241 B242 
256. 3.25E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B6~ B199 B200 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
257. 3.22E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B150 B158 B161 B162 B243 B244 
258. 3.22E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 Bl49 B158 B161 B162 B245 B246 
259. 3.11E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B128 B134 B135 B138 
260. 3.11E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B134 Bl35 B137 
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261. 3.08E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B149 B162 B245 B246 
262. 3.08E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B150 B162 B243 B244 
263. 3.07E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B135 B136 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
264. 3.06E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B149 B158 B161 B164 
265. 3.06E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B150 B158 B161 B163 
266. 3.02E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B124 B133 B134 B135 B239 B240 
267. 3.02E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B134 B137 
268. 3.02E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 Bl28 B133 B134 B135 B241 B242 
269. 3.02E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B128 B134 B138 
270. 2.99E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B136 B239 B240 B241 B242 
271. 2.93E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B149 B164 
272. 2.93E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B150 B163 
273. 2.88E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B70 
274. 2.88E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B641 
275. 2.87E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B150 B159 B161 B243 B244 
276. 2.87E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B149 B159 B161 B245 B246 
277. 2.69E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B1~8 B161 B209 B210 B243 B244 
B245 B246 
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278. 2.64E-08 BO B1 B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B134 B135 B138 B239 B240 
279. 2.64E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B134 B135 B137 B241 B242 
280. 2.58E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B94 B175 B179 
281. 2.57E-08 BO Bl BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B123 B124 B128 B134 B135 
282. 2.57E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B134 B137 B241 B242 
283. 2.57E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B134 B138 B239 B240 
284. 2.57E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B81 B209 B210 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
285. 2.56E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B13~ B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
286. 2.53E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B146 B149 B150 B158 B161 
287. 2.50E-08 BO Bl BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B69 B124 B128 B134 
288. 2.47E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B1518 B161 B162 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
289. 2.42E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B8? B146 B149 B150 
290. 2.36E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B162 B243 B244 B245 B246 
291. 2.35E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B158 B161 B163 B245 B246 
292. 2.35E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B158 B161 B164 B243 B244 
293. 2.32E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B55 B165 B166 B167 
294. 2.32E-08 BO Bl BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B55 B139 B140 B141 
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295. 2.25E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B163 B245 B246 
296. 2.25E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B146 B164 B243 B244 
297. 2.21E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B159 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
298. 2.19E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
299. 2.19E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B123 B128 B134 B135 B241 B242 
300. 2.13E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B69 B124 B134 B239 B240 
301. 2.13E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B128 B135 B136 B202 
302. 2.13E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B69 B128 B134 B241 B242 
303. 2.13E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B124 B135 B136 B201 
304. 2.09E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B149 B158 B161 B162 B212 
305. 2.09E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B150 B158 B161 B162 B211 
306. 2.07E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B124 B136 B201 
307. 2.07E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B128 B136 B202 
308. 2.01E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B76 B88 B172 
309. 2.00E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B150 B162 B211 
310. 2.00E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B81 B149 B162 B212 
311. 1.97E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B134 B135 B137 B241 B242 
312. 1.94E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B146 B149 B158 B161 B245 B246 
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313. 1.94E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B146 B150 B158 B161 B243 B244 
314. 1.89E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B123 B124 B128 B134 B135 
315. 1.87E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B149 B159 B161 B212 
316. 1.87E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 B128 B135 B199 B200 
317. 1.87E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B150 B159 B161 B211 
318. 1.86E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B87 B146 B149 B245 B246 
319. 1.86E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B143 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
320. 1.86E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B146 B149 B150 B158 B161 
321. 1.86E-08 BO B1 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B87 B146 B150 B243 B244 
322. 1.84E-08 BO B1 B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B149 B150 B158 B161 B209 B210 
323. 1.83E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B69 B124 B128 B134 
324. 1.82E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B124 B128 B199 B200 
325. 1.81E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B123 B135 B136 B201 B241 B242 
326. 1.81E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B27 B58 B69 B134 B239 B240 B241 B242 
327. 1.81E-08 BO B1 B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B143 B135 B136 B202 B239 B240 
328. 1.81E-08 BO B1 B4 B13 B14 B39 B40 B41 
BC B43 B219 B220 B221 
329. 1.79E-08 BO B1 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B76 B82 B172 
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330. 1.78E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B87 B146 B149 B150 
331. 1.77E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B124 B133 Bl34 Bl35 B201 
332. 1.77E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B128 B133 Bl34 Bl35 B202 
333. 1.76E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 B10 B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B149 B150 B209 B210 
334. 1.76E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 Bl36 B201 B241 B242 
335. 1.76E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B69 B136 B202 B239 B240 
336. 1.61E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B158 B161 B162 B211 B245 B246 
337. 1.61E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B158 B161 B162 B212 B243 B244 
338. 1.60E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B123 B128 Bl34 B135 B241 B242 
339. 1.60E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
340. 1.60E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B123 B124 B134 B135 B239 B240 
341. 1.59E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B128 B135 B199 B200 B241 
B242 
342. 1.59E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 Bl35 B199 B200 B239 
B240 
343. 1.56E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B69 B124 B134 B239 B240 
344. 1.56E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B69 B128 Bl34 B241 B242 
345. l.SSE-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B128 Bl99 B200 B241 B242 
346. 1.55E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B124 Bl99 B200 B239 B240 
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347. 1.54E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B162 B212 B243 B244 
348. 1.54E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B87 B162 B211 B245 B246 
349. 1.51E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B133 B134 B135 B202 B239 B240 
350. 1.51E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B26 B133 B134 B135 B201 B241 B242 
351. 1.49E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B146 B158 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
352. 1.44E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B159 B161 B212 B243 B244 
353. 1.44E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B34 B146 B159 B161 B211 B245 B246 
354. 1.43E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B87 B146 B243 B244 B245 B246 
355. 1.42E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B146 B150 B158 B161 B243 B244 
356. 1.42E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B146 B149 B158 B161 B245 B246 
357. 1.41E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 BlSO B158 B161 B209 B210 B243 
B244 
358. 1.41E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B149 B158 B161 B209 B210 B245 
B246 
359. 1.36E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B87 B146 B150 B243 B244 
360. 1.36E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B123 B134 B135 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
361. 1.36E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B81 B146 B149 B245 B246 
362. 1.35E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B149 B209 B210 B245 B246 
363. 1.35E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B150 B209 B210 B243 B244 
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364. 1.35E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B135 B199 B200 B239 B240 
B241 B242 
365. 1.35E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B124 B128 B135 B136 
366. 1.33E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B149 B150 B158 B161 B162 
367. 1.33E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B56 B6~ B134 B239 B240 B241 B242 
368. 1.31E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B6~ B199 B200 B239 B240 B241 
B242 
369. 1.31E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B6~ B124 B128 B136 
370. 1.29E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B123 B124 B134 B135 B201 
371. 1.29E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B123 B128 B134 B135 B202 
372. 1.27E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B146 B150 B158 B161 B211 
373. 1.27E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B87 B149 B150 B162 
374. 1.27E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B146 B149 B158 B161 B212 
375. 1.25E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B6~ B124 B134 B201 
376. 1.25E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B128 B134 B135 B138 
377. 1.25E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B69 B128 B134 B202 
378. 1.25E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B124 B134 B135 B137 
379. 1.24E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B94 B176 B177 
380. 1.24E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 Bl46 B149 B158 B161 B164 
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381. 1.24E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B146 B150 B158 B161 B163 
382. 1.22E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B128 B134 B138 
383. 1.22E-08 BO Bl B4 B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B124 B134 B137 
384. 1.21E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B87 B146 B149 B212 
385. 1.21E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B58 B87 B146 B150 B211 
386. 1.19E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B146 B149 B150 B159 B161 
387. 1.18E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B149 B164 
388. 1.18E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B146 B150 B163 
389. 1.17E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B70 
390. 1.17E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B35 B58 B64 
391. 1.15E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B128 B135 B136 B241 B242 
392. 1.15E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B123 B124 B135 B136 B239 B240 
393. 1.13E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B124 B128 B133 B134 B135 
394. 1.12E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B128 B136 B241 B242 
395. 1.12E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B55 B69 B124 B136 B239 B240 
396. 1.09E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B146 B158 B161 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
397. 1.09E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B123 B134 B135 B201 B241 B242 
398. 1.09E-08 BO Bl B5 B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B123 B134 B135 B202 B239 B240 
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399. 1.08E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B158 B161 B209 B210 B243 B244 
B245 B246 
400. 1.07E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B123 B134 B135 B138 B239 B240 
401. 1.06E-08 BO Bl BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B6~ B134 B201 B241 B242 
402. 1.06E-08 BO Bl BS B6 B23 B24 B25 BA 
B26 B58 B69 B134 B202 B239 B240 
403. l.OSE-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B56 B81 B146 B243 B244 B245 B246 
404. 1.04E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B134 B137 B241 B242 
405. 1.04E-08 BO Bl B4 B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 
BB B35 B87 B209 B210 B243 B244 B245 
B246 
406. 1.04E-08 BO Bl B4 BS B6 B23 B24 B25 
BA B27 B69 B134 B138 B239 B240 
407. 1.02E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 B149 B158 B161 B162 B245 B246 
408. 1.02E-08 BO Bl B9 BlO B31 B32 B33 BB 
B34 B55 Bl50 B158 B161 B162 B243 B244 
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